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We study the optimal timing of adoption of a service innovation that a new entrant firm brings to a market
populated by two incumbent firms. Our analysis is based on a model of competitive diffusion dynamics that
extends the monopolistic Bass model to include customer churn processes, as well as a potential market
expansion resulting from the introduction of the innovation. We obtain expressions for the time trajectories
of the customer bases, i.e., the numbers of customers that use old and new service processes for the competing
firms in a general setting, as well as sharper, closed-form characterizations for the setting with a stable
market and homogeneous imitation process.
In modeling competitive dynamics we consider settings where incumbents anticipate a potential failure
of the innovation. We use the trajectories for the customer bases to model an optimal adoption response
problem faced by one of the incumbent firms in the setting in which the adoption time for the other incumbent
can be anticipated or is pre-announced, and analyze this problem in the absence of market expansion or
intra-generational customer churn. Using the optimal response results, we provide the Nash equilibrium
analysis of the adoption decisions by competing incumbent firms and derive sufficient conditions for the
“now-now”, “now-never” and “never-never” adoption equilibria. We use the trading volume data from the
foreign exchange markets to estimate the parameters of the competitive diffusion dynamics for our model
and to conduct a numerical investigation of the impact of the uncertainty associated with the success of the
innovation on the incumbents’ Nash equilibrium adoption times.
Key words : OR in Marketing, Optimal Adoption Timing, Nash Equilibria, Diffusion Models
1
Pac¸, Savin, and Velu: When to Adopt a Service Innovation: Nash Equilibria in a Competitive Diffusion Framework
2 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
1. Introduction
Innovations driven by new technologies are being introduced at increasing speed (Ringel et al.
2015). The shorter life-cycle times underscore the importance for firms to appropriately time their
innovation adoption decisions. Multiple studies have shown that an innovation adoption time is
an important marketing decision, which can determine the success of the innovation (Golder and
Tellis 1993; Shankar et al. 1998; Frattini et al. 2013; Bhargava et al. 2013). In the present work, we
consider a service setting in which a market entrant firm, leveraging a new technology to launch
an innovation, enters the market populated by two incumbent firms. We use the term “customer
base” to denote the numbers of customer accounts that, at a given time, use a particular firm-
business model combination. The incumbents with differing initial customer bases need to respond
by deciding when to adopt the innovation. Such a setting is commonly found in many industries,
and it has long been observed that some incumbent firms are quick to adopt an innovation while
others appear to be very slow.
For example, incumbent firms adopted online business models at different times in the equity
brokerage market and the foreign exchange market in the US. Charles Schwab, the major firm in
equity brokerage market, adopted the online brokerage model before the minor firm, Ameritrade.
In contrast, Atriax, formed by the consortium of major banks in the foreign exchange market
adopted an online foreign exchange model only after the minor banks adopted such a model via a
consortium called FXAll. These contrasting observations about the timing of adoption of innovation
by incumbents raise the question about the underlying reasons that drive the innovation adoption
decision.
The issue of innovation adoption in a competitive setting is the focus of a number of papers
in the economics literature. Benoit (1985) argues that the time when the incumbent firms adopt
innovation depends on the expected profits that the innovation brings: the greater the expected
profits from innovation, the earlier the adoption. However, the greater expected profits also increase
the likelihood of adoption by rival firms, which might decrease the expected gains. These forces
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work in opposite directions and the net result might depend on one firm’s evaluation of the other
firm’s response.
Several studies have also shown how uncertainty regarding the profitability of an innovation
affects the adoption decision (Doraszelski 2004; Jensen 1988; Mamer and McCardle 1987; McCardle
1984). As argued in Rogers (1962), innovation adoption is often a contagious process due to the
presence of strong imitation effects. Furthermore, it has been argued that contagion effects could be
strengthened by the potential for substitution of the existing market by the market created by the
innovation (King and Tucci 2002) or by a gradual reduction in uncertainty about the attractiveness
of the innovation (Gilbert and Lierberman 1987; Haunschild and Miner 1997). In addition, several
studies have shown that the introduction of an innovation could increase the size of the potential
market, which in turn might affect the speed of response by incumbent firms (Golder and Tellis
1993; Sorescu et al. 2003; Aboulnasr et al. 2008)
All the papers described above consider static adoption settings. In particular, none of the above
studies provide a detailed analytical account of customer adoption dynamics and how this might
affect firms’ profits and influence innovation adoption decisions. On the other hand, the marketing
literature contains a well-developed stream of papers, starting with the seminal work of Bass (1969),
focusing on the dynamics of innovation adoption by customers.
The literature on the diffusion of products and services in competitive settings has seen signif-
icant growth in recent years (Libai et al. 2009a; Libai et al. 2009b; Guseo and Montarino 2012;
Guseo and Montarino 2014; Guseo and Montarino 2015). While a review paper by Peres et al.
(2010) calls for an increased focus on the analysis of the optimal market entry timing, the literature
on when to adopt an innovation or launch a new product in a competitive setting remains rela-
tively sparse. Savin and Terwiesch (2005) and Guseo and Montarino (2010) looked at the optimal
market entry time by considering a two-firm competitive diffusion model to study the life-cycle
market shares of competing firms. A model of the optimal market entry with a single incumbent is
analyzed in Joshi et al. (2009). In the present analysis, we extend Savin and Terwiesch (2005) by
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considering simultaneous diffusion processes of old and new business models in a three-firm setting.
Our ultimate goal is to address the limitation of the extant literature and analyze the equilibria
of innovation adoption decisions emerging under a setting with competitive diffusion dynamics.
Given the complexity of the analysis of the optimal adoption timing decisions, we assume in our
modeling, similar to Savin and Terwiesch (2005) and Joshi et al. (2009), that the marketing-mix
variables, such as pricing and advertising, are predetermined. This assumption describes an envi-
ronment where the innovation adoption decisions are made in the presence of the independently set
marketing-mix levels. Our diffusion model includes the intra-firm and inter-firm imitation processes
in a Bass-like setting and increases in market potential for both the existing business model, as well
as the new business model, upon the introduction of innovation (Mahajan et al. 1993; Krishnan et
al. 2000). In addition, we incorporate intra-generational churn, whereby customers switch between
firms within the same business model (Gupta et al. 2004; Libai et al 2009a).
Our modeling and the results of our analysis can be summarized as follows:
1. We extend the classical Bass-like approach to describe dynamics of adoption of a new service
business model in a market populated by two incumbent firms and a single entrant firm. We
consider a generalized setting in which the speed of the imitation adoption depends on whether
the new business model is also offered by one of the incumbent firms or only by the entrant firm.
2. We provide a characterization of the diffusion trajectories of the customer bases for each com-
peting firm and each service business model in the general setting and derive closed-form expressions
in homogeneous and asymmetric imitation settings (Propositions 1-5). We also derive expressions
for the terminal customer base values, which are often viewed as proxies for overall profits and for
the strength of firms’ competitive positions, both with and without intra-generational customer
churn (Proposition 6). These values are expressed in terms of a few easy-to-estimate parameters.
We also analyze the impact of the market expansion resulting from the introduction of the service
model innovation and show that the incumbents may initially benefit from its introduction, as it
attracts new potential customers for all competitors in the market.
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3. We model setting where the business model introduced by the entrant firm has a risk of failing
and derive the closed-form expressions for the diffusion trajectories of the incumbent firms after
potential failure of the service innovation (Proposition 7).
4. For the setting with asymmetric churn processes, we obtain closed-form expressions for the
terminal values of customer base for the cases when the new service model fails as well as when it
succeeds (Proposition 8).
5. The optimal adoption response problem faced by an incumbent firm is analyzed in a setting
where the adoption time of the other incumbent can be anticipated or is preannounced. Using the
expressions for the diffusion trajectories, we establish quasiconcavity of the firm’s profit function
(Proposition 9) and show that the optimal adoption response time is a non-decreasing function of
the firm’s initial profit-adjusted customer base values (Proposition 10) in the absence of market
expansion or intra-generational customer churn.
6. For the same setting, we provide Nash equilibrium analysis of adoption decisions by compet-
ing incumbent firms and derive sufficient conditions for the realization of three adoption equilib-
ria: immediate adoption by both incumbents, maximum-delay adoption by both incumbents, and
immediate-delayed mixture of equilibrium adoption times (Proposition 11). We also show that in
settings where the time discounting of profits is negligible, these equilibria are the only ones that
can be observed.
7. We use the the FX market data, shown in Appendix B, to estimate the parameters of our
model (Section 3) and apply the estimates to the numerical evaluation of the Nash equilibria in
the new service model adoption times by the incumbents (Section 5).
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce our model and derive expres-
sions for the diffusion trajectories of the customer base values for each competing firm. Section 3
describes the analysis of the optimal adoption response decisions and the Nash equilibria adop-
tion times. The implications of our findings and the directions for future research are discussed in
Section 4.
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2. Competitive Diffusion Dynamics in the Presence of Innovation
Consider a market populated by two incumbent firms (major incumbent and minor incumbent),
which is faced (at t = 0) with the entry of a new firm. In reality, the major incumbent and the
minor incumbent firms can represent clusters of firms that form a consortia (e.g., top 3 vs. the
rest of the market), which are similar in the way they approach the introduction of a new business
model. We assume that the entrant firm employs only the new service model. In order to account
for the uncertain, unproven nature of the service innovation and the possibility of its “failure”, we
assume that the new model fails with probability PF ∈ [0,1] and succeeds with probability 1−PF .
In the case of success, the new firm (and the new service model) remains in the market at any
t≥ 0. In the case of failure, the new entrant (and the new service model) remains on the market
for t∈ [0, TF ], and then exits the market. We assume that the time-to-failure TF , if failure occurs,
is a random variable distributed on [0,+∞] according to the CDF Φ(·). In our analysis, we treat
both the value of the failure probability PF as well as the distributional information describing the
time-to-failure TF as known to both incumbents.
In our analysis, we assume that incumbents 1 and 2 commit, at time t = 0, to adopting the
innovation at t= t1 ≥ 0 and t= t2 ≥ 0, respectively, provided that the new entrant remains on the
market at those times. We model the dynamics for the customer base for the old and the new
service model using the classical framework proposed by Bass (1969) for describing adoption of
durable goods and extended by Libai et al. (2009b) to include the diffusion of services.
The specific form of the customer base trajectory equations at any time t depends on whether
by this time the service innovation has been adopted by one (or both) of the incumbents.
In particular, the customer base dynamics proceeds through a set of distinct phases. For example,
consider the case where the innovation is successful and the new entrant remains on the market for
any positive t. Then, in phase I corresponding to the time period [0,min(t1, t2)], the entrant firm
is the only one to employ the new service model. Phase II (t ∈ [min (t1, t2) ,max(t1, t2)]) describes
the competitive market-share dynamics in the period when the innovation has been adopted by
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only one of the incumbents. Next, in phase III (t∈ (max(t1, t2) ,+∞)) both incumbents employ
the new service model. Note that, if the innovation fails, then the customer base dynamics will
contain an additional phase that starts at time t= TF . In this phase, which we call phase IV, both
incumbents compete using the old service model.
Thus, at any time t≥ 0, the customer market base M can potentially be comprised of as many
as 6 customer groups: two customer groups, mo1(t) and m
o
2(t), which continue to do business with
one of the incumbent firms using the old service model, three customer groups, mn1 (t), m
n
2 (t), and
mn3 (t), which switch to the new service model offered by either one of the incumbents (firms 1
and 2) or by the new entrant (firm 3), and the group of customers who have not yet adopted any
service model.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of this market structure. Two features of the customer dynamics
we model deserve a separate mention. First, in addition to the adoption of the new service model
by customers who previously used the old one, we also consider the “churn” adoptions, that is,
switching between firms within the same type of service model. This “churn” feature is common in
the models of inter-generational product adoption and diffusion of services (Gupta et al. 2004; Libai
et al. 2009a, Libai et al. 2009b, Peres et al. 2010). Second, we assume that the introduction of the
new service model by a “newcomer” firm leads to the expansion in overall market size for both new
and old models from mo1(0) +m
o
2(0) to M≥ mo1(0) +mo2(0), with M−mo1(0)−mo2(0) representing
the size of the market increase; in other words, the initial number of customers who have yet to
adopt any service model. The increase in the overall market potential upon the introduction of
innovation we use in our model is consistent with previous research on technological substitution
and diffusion (Mahajan et al. 1993; Golder and Tellis 1993; Sorescu et al. 2003; Aboulnasr et al.
2008). The market potential expansion is modeled in the form of a one-off increase following the
introduction of the innovation (Wilson and Norton 1989; Mahajan and Muller 1996; Krishnan et
al. 2000).
Table 1 summarizes the notation we use in our model.
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Notation Description
t1 Innovation adoption time by the 1st incumbent
t2 Innovation adoption time by the 2st incumbent
PF Probability that the innovation fails
TF Time when the innovation fails, given the failure
moi (t) Customer base of the “old” service model for incumbent i= 1,2 at time t
mni (t) Customer base of the “new” service model for incumbent i= 1,2 at time t
mn3(t) Customer base of the “new” service model for the new entrant at time t
M Total market potential
po Innovation coefficient for the “old” service model
qo Imitation coefficient for the “old” service model
poc Innovation “churn” coefficient for the “old” service model
qoc Imitation “churn” coefficient for the “old” service model
pn Innovation coefficient for the “new” service model
qn Imitation coefficient for the “new” service model offered by the new entrant
Qn Imitation coefficient for the “new” service model offered by an incumbent
pnc Innovation “churn” coefficient for the “new” service model
Table 1 Description of notation.
Below we conduct a detailed analysis of the competitive diffusion dynamics for each of the four
adoption phases described above. We first consider the case where the new model succeeds and
describe the dynamics of the first three phases of the market-share dynamics. Then, we add the
description of the phase IV that appears if the new model fails.
2.1. Phase I: “New Entrant Only”
In this phase the new entrant is the only firm that uses the new service model. Let tf = min(t1, t2).
Then, at any time t∈ [0, tf ], the entire marketM consists of four groups of customers: moi (t), i= 1,2
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o
1m
o
2m
n
1m
n
2m
n
3m
Major incumbent: 
“old” model
New entrant:  
“new” model
Minor incumbent: 
“old” model
Total market potential
Minor incumbent” 
“new” model
Major incumbent: 
“new” model
Figure 1 Customer groups in a competitive market
- those that continue to do business with the incumbent firm i through the “old” service model;
mn3(t) - those who opt to do business with the entrant firm; as well as those (M−mo1(t)−mo2(t)−
mn3(t)) who have not yet adopted either service model. We assume that the new entrant operates
exclusively through the new service model. We also assume that at the time when the innovation
becomes available, the customer base for the major incumbent is higher than that for the minor
incumbent: mo1(0) =M >m=m
o
2(0). In addition, the initial customer base for the new entrant is 0:
mn3 (0) = 0 (in other words, at t= 0 the number of customers who have not yet adopted any business
model is given byM−M −m). In describing the competitive diffusion dynamics, we will follow the
diffusion approach widely used in the marketing literature to describe the adoption of innovations.
In his seminal paper, Bass (1969) has applied contagion biological models to describe the process of
adoption of durable products in a monopolistic setting. Since then, Bass’ approach has been shown
to be a reliable descriptor of innovation dynamics in many settings, and the definition of innovation
was extended to include new services (Peres et al. 2010). We propose the following generalization
of Bass diffusion dynamics for the competitive setting described above:
dmo1
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
1
)
(M−mo1−mo2−mn3)
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+
(
poc +
qoc
Mm
o
1
)
mo2−
(
pn +
qn
Mm
n
3 + poc +
qoc
Mm
o
2
)
mo1, (1)
dmo2
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
2
)
(M−mo1−mo2−mn3)
+
(
poc +
qoc
Mm
o
2
)
mo1−
(
pn +
qn
Mm
n
3 + poc +
qoc
Mm
o
1
)
mo2, (2)
dmn3
dt
=
(
pn +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
(M−mn3) . (3)
Equation (1) describes the evolution of customer base of the “old” service model through the major
incumbent in the presence of a new service model. Such evolution proceeds through two major
channels: 1) increase through both innovation and imitation adoption processes from customers who
were either using the old service model through the minor incumbent (the term
(
poc +
qoc
Mm
o
1
)
mo2)
or were not using any service model, old or new (the term (po + qom
o
1/M) (M−mo1−mo2−mn3)),
and 2) decrease caused by customers switching over to the old service model provided by the
minor incumbent (the term
(
poc +
qoc
Mm
o
2
)
mo1) or to the innovation provided by the new entrant
(the term (pn + qnm
n
3/M)mo1). In (1), innovation and imitation diffusion processes that result in
the adoption of an old (new) service model are characterized by parameters po (pn) and qo (qn),
respectively. Similarly, the intra-generational churn is characterized by the innovation parameter
poc, and the imitation parameter qoc. The intra-generational churn innovation and imitation are not
firm-specific and occur through symmetric coefficients. In other words, the churn adoption from
firm 1’s customer base into firm 2’s service model occurs through identical innovation/imitation
terms (poc and qoc) with the churn adoption from firm 2’s customer base into firm 1’s service
model. Note that the term describing intra-generational imitation from firm 2 to firm 1
(
qoc
Mm
o
1m
o
2
)
is equal to the similar term describing intra-generational imitation from firm 1 to firm 2. Hence,
the churn-imitation terms
(
qoc
Mm
o
im
o
j
)
can be dropped from the diffusion equations, as we will do
for the rest of the paper. Equation (2) describes the dynamics of the minor incumbent’s customer
base in a similar fashion, while equation (3) reflects the growth of the entrant firm’s customer base
(associated with the new business model). We note that equation (3) has the standard Bass form,
which, subject to the initial condition mn3 (0) = 0, produces a closed-form Bass-like solution:
mn3 (t) =M
(
1− qn + pn
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
. (4)
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Equations (1)-(2) differ from the classical Bass form in a substantial way; yet, combined with initial
conditions mo1(0) = M and m
o
2(0) = m (m+M <M) they also admit closed-form solutions. In
order to describe these solutions, it is convenient to introduce the following notation. For a given
set of diffusion parameters po, qo, pn, and qn, define
F̂I (po, pn, qo, qn, t) = 2F1
(
2po + pn + qn
qn + pn
,1− qo
qn
;
2(po + pn + qn)
qn + pn
;− qn
pn
)
− e−(2po+pn+qn)t2
× 2F1
(
2po + pn + qn
qn + pn
,1− qo
qn
;
2(po + pn + qn)
qn + pn
;− qn
pn
e−(pn+qn)t
)
, (5)
where 2F1(a, b; c;x) is the hypergeometric function:
2F1(a, b; c;x) = 1 +
ab
1!c
x+
a(a+ 1)b(b+ 1)
2!c(c+ 1)
x2 + ...
=
+∞∑
n=0
a× ...× (a+n− 1)× b× ...× (b+n− 1)
n!c× ...× (c+n− 1) x
n =
+∞∑
n=0
(a)n(b)n
n!(c)n
xn. (6)
In addition, let
ĜI (po, pn, qo, qn, t) = 1−
e−(2po+pn+qn)t
(
(qn+pn)e
(qn+pn)t
qn+pne(qn+pn)t
)( qn−qoqn )(
M
M−m−M −
qo(1+ qnpn )
(1− qoqn )
2po+pn+qn
F̂I (po, pn, qo, qn, t)
) , (7)
ĤI (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t) =
(M −m) (qn + pn)e(qo−2poc)t
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
e−qo
∫ t
0 ĜI (po,pn,qo,qn,τ)dτ . (8)
Using the definitions (5)-(8), the time evolution of the customer base trajectories for competing
firms in this phase of the diffusion process can be described as follows.
Proposition 1. For t∈ [0, tf ] , the market share functions
mo1(t) =
1
2
(
M
(
ĜI (po, pn, qo, qn, t)− 1 + qn + pn
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
+ ĤI (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t)
)
,
mo2(t) =
1
2
(
M
(
ĜI (po, pn, qo, qn, t)− 1 + qn + pn
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
− ĤI (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t)
)
,
mn3 (t) = M
(
1− qn + pn
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
, (9)
solve the competitive diffusion dynamics equations (1)-(3) subject to the initial conditions mo1(0) =
M , mo2(0) =m, and m
n
3 (0) = 0.
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Proposition 1 states that in a setting where the new entrant is the only provider of the new
service model, the time evolution of its customer base is still described by the Bass-like dynamics.
However, the corresponding dynamics for the incumbent firms may be substantially different from
the one predicted by the monopolistic Bass analysis. The expressions of (9) take a simpler form
in two special settings. In the first setting, there is no “word-of-mouth” effect in the old service
model dynamics, namely, qo = 0. In the second setting, diffusion dynamics proceed without market
expansion (M=M +m) or customer churn (poc = 0).
Corollary 1.1. If qo = 0, the customer base trajectories for the competing firms for any t ∈
[0, tf ] can be expressed as
mo1(t) =
1
2
(
(qn + pn) (M− e−2pot(M−m−M) + (M −m)e−2poct)
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
,
mo2(t) =
1
2
(
(qn + pn) (M− e−2pot(M−m−M)− (M −m)e−2poct)
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
,
mn3 (t) = M
(
1− qn + pn
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
. (10)
In the second special setting, the introduction of the innovation does not cause an expansion in the
overall market potential (M=M+m), and there is no intra-generational customer churn (poc = 0).
In this setting the diffusion dynamics are solely governed by customers switching from the old
service model to the new one.
Corollary 1.2. For M=M +m and poc = 0, the customer bases of the competing firms for
any t∈ [0, tf ] can be expressed as
mo1(t) = M
(
qn + pn
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
,mo2(t) =m
(
qn + pn
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
,mn3 (t) =M
(
1− qn + pn
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
)
. (11)
2.2. Phase II: “New Entrant and One Incumbent”
In order to counteract the detrimental effect of the new business model on their customer base,
the incumbents may decide to adopt the new service model. Let ti, i= 1,2 be the time at which
incumbent i starts offering a new service model alongside its old model, and denote min (t1, t2)
as tf and max(t1, t2) as ts. Consider the period of time t ∈ [tf , ts] after the adoption of the new
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service model by the first incumbent, but before adoption by the second incumbent. Without
the loss of generality, we consider the situation where the minor incumbent is first to adopt the
new model, namely, tf = t2 and ts = t1. In the time phase between tf and ts, two firms (the
entrant and the minor incumbent) offer a new service model, and the market base M is split into
five distinct customer groups. As before, moi (t), i = 1,2 denote the customers who remain with
incumbent firms and with the old service model, mni (t), i= 2,3 correspond to the customers who
do business with the minor incumbent or with the entrant using the new service model, while
M−mo1(t)−mo2(t)−mn2(t)−mn3(t) corresponds to the group of customers who have not yet adopted
any service model. The competitive diffusion dynamics in this phase are described by
dmo1
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
1
)
(M−mo1−mo2−mn2 −mn3) + pocmo2
−
(
poc + 2pn +
Qn
Mm
n
2 +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
mo1, (12)
dmo2
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
2
)
(M−mo1−mo2−mn2 −mn3) + pocmo1
−
(
poc + 2pn +
Qn
Mm
n
2 +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
mo2, (13)
dmn2
dt
=
(
pn +
Qn
Mm
n
2
)
(M−mn2 −mn3) + pncmn3 − pncmn2 , (14)
dmn3
dt
=
(
pn +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
(M−mn2 −mn3) + pncmn2 − pncmn3 , (15)
with the initial conditions
mo1(tf ) =
1
2
M
(
ĜI (po, pn, qo, qn, tf )− 1 + qn+pn
qn+pne
(qn+pn)tf
)
+ĤI (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, tf )
 , (16)
mo2(tf ) =
1
2
M
(
ĜI (po, pn, qo, qn, tf )− 1 + qn+pn
qn+pne
(qn+pn)tf
)
−ĤI (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, tf )
 , (17)
mn2 (tf ) = 0,m
n
3 (tf ) =M
(
1− qn + pn
qn + pne
(qn+pn)tf
)
, (18)
reflecting the results of Proposition 1.
Equations (12) and (13) describe the customer base of the incumbents’ old business models,
mo1 and m
o
2, which evolve via innovation and imitation by non-adopters (po and qo terms), intra-
generational churn (poc terms) and adoption of the new service model (pn, qn, and Qn terms). In
Pac¸, Savin, and Velu: When to Adopt a Service Innovation: Nash Equilibria in a Competitive Diffusion Framework
14 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
this diffusion phase, we allow the imitation terms for the new service model to have an asymmetric
form. In particular, the probability of adopting the new model depends on whether the imitation
contact occurred with the incumbent or the entrant firm’s customer. In numerous settings, incum-
bents enjoy a stronger imitation process due to brand awareness. We model this by using different
parameters to describe the imitation of the incumbent’s new service model (Qn), and the entrant’s
service model (qn with qn ≤Qn). Strong brand awareness results in shorter take-off periods for the
incumbent’s customer base, as suggested by equation (14). Modeling the brand awareness effect
provides an additional layer of realism to the model, while increasing its analytical complexity.
Finally, equation (15) describes the dynamics of the new entrant’s customer base, evolving through
innovation, imitation and churn. Note that in (14)-(15) the parameter pnc describes the inter-firm
churn process for customers that use the new service model.
The diffusion dynamics (12)-(15), while providing a detailed description of a competitive diffu-
sion setting, yield closed-form solutions for the customer base trajectories in two special settings
described below.
2.2.1. Ballooning Market with Symmetric Brand Effect In this section we consider
a setting allowing market expansion (M≥M + m) and intra-generational churn (poc, pnc > 0).
In addition, we assume that the imitation process in the adoption of the new service model is
symmetric. In other words, we assume that the incumbent’s new service model adoption does not
enjoy a brand awareness advantage over the new entrant’s one, so that Qn = qn. This assumption is
along the lines of the brand communication model of Krishnan et al. (2000), whereby cross-brand
and intra-brand influences are equal.
For a given set of diffusion parameters po, qo, pn, and qn, define
α=
(2pn + qn)(qn + pne
(pn+qn)tf )
pn + qn
− qn, (19)
F̂II (po, pn, qo, qn, t) = 2F1
(
1,
2po + 2pn + qn
2pn + qn
+
qo
qn
;
2(po + 2pn + qn)
2pn + qn
;−qn
α
)
−e−(2po+2pn+qn)(t−tf )
(
α+ qne
−(2pn+qn)(t−tf )
α+ qn
) qo
qn
(20)
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× 2F1
(
1,
2po + 2pn + qn
2pn + qn
+
qo
qn
;
2(po + 2pn + qn)
2pn + qn
;−qn
α
e−(2pn+qn)(t−tf )
)
.
In addition, let
ĜII (po, pn, qo, qn, t) = 1−
e−(2po+2pn+qn)(t−tf )
(
(qn+α)e
(qn+2pn)(t−tf )
qn+αe
(qn+2pn)(t−tf )
)( qn−qoqn )(
1
1−ĜI(po,pn,qo,qn,tf)
− qo(α+qn)
α(2po+2pn+qn)
F̂II (po, pn, qo, qn, t)
) , (21)
ĤII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t) =
ĤI (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, tf ) (α+ qn)e
(qo−2poc)(t−tf)
qn +αe
(qn+2pn)(t−tf )
×e−qo
∫ t
tf
ĜII (po,pn,qo,qn,τ)dτ , (22)
n(t) = M
(
1− 2pn + qn
αe(2pn+qn)(t−tf ) + qn
)
, (23)
a(t) =
mn3 (tf )e
(2(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−tf )(α+ qn)
αe(2pn+qn)(t−tf ) + qn
(24)
= M
(
pn(2pn + qn)e
(2pn−2pnc+qn)(t−tf )(e(pn+qn)tf − 1)
(αe(2pn+qn)(t−tf ) + qn)(pn + qn)
)
. (25)
Then, the diffusion dynamics in this phase can be described as follows.
Proposition 2. For any t∈ [tf , ts] the market shares can be expressed as
mo1(t) =
MĜII (po, pn, qo, qn, t)−n(t) + ĤII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t)
2
,
mo2(t) =
MĜII (po, pn, qo, qn, t)−n(t)− ĤII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t)
2
,
mn2(t) =
n(t)− a(t)
2
,mn3(t) =
n(t) + a(t)
2
. (26)
We can get simpler closed-form expressions for customer base trajectories, considering the case
where there is no “word-of-mouth” effect for the old service model.
Corollary 2.1. If qo = 0, the customer base trajectories of the competing firms for any t ∈
[0, tf ] can be expressed as
mo1(t) =
1
2
(
(qn + 2pn) (M− e−2pot(M−m−M) + (M −m)e−2poct)
qn +αe
(qn+2pn)(t−tf )
)
,
mo2(t) =
1
2
(
(qn + 2pn) (M− e−2pot(M−m−M)− (M −m)e−2poct)
qn +αe
(qn+2pn)(t−tf )
)
,
mn2 (t) =
n(t)− a(t)
2
,mn3 (t) =
n(t) + a(t)
2
. (27)
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2.2.2. Mature Market with Asymmetric Brand Effect As in the previous phase, we
restrict the focus to a setting where a) the new service model does not cause an expansion in
the overall market potential (M=M +m), and b) there is no intra-generational customer churn
(poc = pnc = 0). This assumption is similar to the brand communication model of Kalish et al.
(1995), whereby the influence of communication is only within brand. However, we allow the
incumbents to enjoy a brand awareness advantage in customer imitation by letting Qn > qn. For
the convenience of future analysis, we introduce the following notation corresponding to relative
(percentage) customer bases:
oi(t) =
moi (t)
M , i= 1,2, ni(t) =
mni (t)
M , i= 1,2,3,
and θ= MM . Also, for Qn > 0, let
S (x, z) =

pn
Qn
((
pn+qnx
pn+qnz
)Qn
qn − 1
)
, qn > 0,
pn
Qn
(
e
Qn(x−z)
pn − 1
)
, qn = 0.
(28)
Proposition 3. If the introduction of the new service model does not expand the overall market
potential (M=M + m), and there is no intra-generational customer churn (poc = pnc = 0), the
percentage customer base trajectories of the competing firms for any t∈ [tf , ts] can be expressed as
t− tf =
n3(t)∫
n3(tf )
dy
(pn + qny) (1− y−S(y,n3(tf ))) ,
o1(t) = θ (1−n3(t)−S (n3(t), n3(tf ))) ,
o2(t) = (1− θ) (1−n3(t)−S (n3(t), n3(tf ))) ,
n2(t) = S (n3(t), n3(tf )) . (29)
Proposition 3 expresses the customer bases of present firm/service model combinations at any
point in time through the value of an easy-to-evaluate integral. The expressions of (29) can be
further simplified in the case when the word-of-mouth effects of the new service model are firm-
independent, so that qn =Qn.
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Corollary 3.1. When the introduction of the new service model does not expand the overall
market potential (M=M +m), there is no intra-generational customer churn (poc = pnc = 0), and
imitation occurs through symmetric terms (qn =Qn > 0), the customer bases of the competing firms
for any t∈ [tf , ts] can be expressed as
n3(t) =
pn
(
1− pn
qn
)
+ (pn + qn)n3 (tf )
2pn + qnn3 (tf )
−
(pn (qn + pn) + qn(2pn + qn)n3 (tf ))
(
pn
(
1− pn
qn
)
−n3 (tf ) (pn− qn + qnn3 (tf ))
)
(pn + qnn3 (tf )) (2pn + qnn3 (tf ))2 e(pn(2pn+qnn3(tf))+pn(qn−pn)+qn(pn+qn)n3(tf))(t−tf)(pn+qnn3(tf)) + 1

,
o1(t) = θ
(
1−n3(t)− pn
(
n3(t)−n3(tf )
pn + qnn3(tf )
))
, o2(t) = (1− θ)
(
1−n3(t)− pn
(
n3(t)−n3(tf )
pn + qnn3(tf )
))
,
n2(t) = pn
(
n3(t)−n3(tf )
pn + qnn3(tf )
)
. (30)
2.3. Phase III: “New Entrant and Two Incumbents”
For any time t > ts, in addition to the customer groups described in the previous section, there
appears mn1(t), the group of customers who adopt the new service model through the incumbent
firm 1. The diffusion dynamics are now described by the following set of differential equations:
dmo1
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
1
)
(M−mo1−mo2−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + pocmo2
−
(
poc + 3pn +
Qn
M (m
n
1 +m
n
2) +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
mo1, (31)
dmo2
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
2
)
(M−mo1−mo2−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + pocmo1
−
(
poc + 3pn +
Qn
M (m
n
1 +m
n
2) +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
mo2, (32)
dmn1
dt
=
(
pn +
Qn
Mm
n
1
)
(M−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + pnc (mn2 +mn3)− 2pncmn1 , (33)
dmn2
dt
=
(
pn +
Qn
Mm
n
2
)
(M−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + pnc (mn1 +mn3)− 2pncmn2 , (34)
dmn3
dt
=
(
pn +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
(M−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + pnc (mn1 +mn2)− 2pncmn3 (35)
augmented by the initial conditions following from the solution of the previous phase. For example,
the initial conditions in the case of symmetric imitation (Qn = qn) (31)-(35) are
mo1(ts) =
MĜII (po, pn, qo, qn, ts)−n(t) + ĤII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, ts)
2
, (36)
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mo2(ts) =
MĜII (po, pn, qo, qn, ts)−n(t)− ĤII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, ts)
2
, (37)
mn1 (ts) = 0,m
n
2 (ts) =
n(ts)− a(ts)
2
,mn3 (ts) =
n(ts) + a(ts)
2
. (38)
2.3.1. Ballooning Market with Symmetric Brand Effect As in the previous phases, we
first consider the setting allowing market expansion (M≥M +m) and intra-generational churn
(poc, pnc > 0), while restricting ourselves to symmetric word-of-mouth effects for the new service
model (Qn = qn). For a given set of diffusion parameters po, qo, pn, and qn, define
λ=
(3pn + qn)(qn +αe
(2pn+qn)(ts−tf))
2pn + qn
− qn (39)
F̂III (po, pn, qo, qn, t) = 2F1
(
1,
2po + 3pn + qn
3pn + qn
+
qo
qn
;
2(po + 3pn + qn)
3pn + qn
;−qn
λ
)
−e−(2po+3pn+qn)(t−ts)
(
λ+ qne
−(3pn+qn)(t−ts)
λ+ qn
) qo
qn
(40)
× 2F1
(
1,
2po + 3pn + qn
3pn + qn
+
qo
qn
;
2(po + 3pn + qn)
3pn + qn
;−qn
λ
e−(3pn+qn)(t−ts)
)
,
In addition, let
ĜIII (po, pn, qo, qn, t) = 1−
e−(2po+3pn+qn)(t−ts)
(
(qn+λ)e
(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
qn+λe(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
)( qn−qoqn )(
1
1−ĜII (po,pn,qo,qn,ts)
− qo(λ+qn)
λ(2po+3pn+qn)
F̂III (po, pn, qo, qn, t)
) , (41)
ĤIII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t) =
ĤII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, ts) (λ+ qn)e
(qo−2poc)(t−ts)
qn +λe(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
(42)
×e−qo
∫ t
ts
ĜIII (po,pn,qo,qn,τ)dτ ,
n̂(t) = M
(
1− 3pn + qn
λe(3pn+qn)(t−ts) + qn
)
, (43)
â(t) =
a(ts)e
(3(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−ts)(λ+ qn)
λe(3pn+qn)(t−ts) + qn
, b̂(t) =
mn2(ts)e
(3(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−ts)(λ+ qn)
λe(3pn+qn)(t−ts) + qn
. (44)
The diffusion dynamics in this phase can be described as follows.
Proposition 4. For t > ts, the competitive diffusion dynamics can be expressed as
mo1(t) =
MĜIII (po, pn, qo, qn, t)− n̂(t) + ĤIII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t)
2
,
mo2(t) =
MĜIII (po, pn, qo, qn, t)− n̂(t)− ĤIII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t)
2
,
mn1 (t) =
n̂(t)− 2b̂(t)− â(t)
3
,mn2 (t) =
n(t) + b̂(t)− â(t)
3
,mn3 (t) =
n(t) + b̂(t) + 2â(t)
3
. (45)
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Similar to the dynamics in the previous phase, generalized expressions of (45) convert to simpler
closed-form when there is no “word-of-mouth” effect for the old service model.
Corollary 4.1. When there is no word-of-mouth effect for the old service model (qo = 0), the
customer bases of the competing firms for t > ts, can be expressed as
mo1(t) =
1
2
(
(qn + 3pn) (M− e−2pot(M−m−M) + (M −m)e−2poct)
qn +λe(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
)
,
mo2(t) =
1
2
(
(qn + 3pn) (M− e−2pot(M−m−M)− (M −m)e−2poct)
qn +λe(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
)
,
mn1 (t) =
n̂(t)− 2b̂(t)− â(t)
3
,mn2 (t) =
n̂(t) + b̂(t)− â(t)
3
,mn3 (t) =
n̂(t) + b̂(t) + 2â(t)
3
. (46)
2.3.2. Mature Market with Asymmetric Brand Effect Once again, we focus on the
adoption of the new service model, assuming that the new model does not expand the potential
market (M = M +m) and there is no intra-generational customer churn (poc = pnc = 0). Never-
theless, we allow for asymmetric imitation (Qn > qn) to reflect the incumbents’ potential brand
awareness advantage.
Proposition 5. When the introduction of the new service model does not expand the overall
market potential (M=M +m), and there is no intra-generational customer churn (poc = pnc = 0),
the percentage customer bases of the competing firms for t≥ ts, can be expressed as
t− ts =
n3(t)∫
n3(ts)
dy
(pn + qny)
(
1−S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))− y−S(y,n3(ts))
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)) ,
o1(t) = θ
(
1−n3(t)−S (n3(t), n3(ts))
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
−S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
,
o2(t) = (1− θ)
(
1−n3(t)−S (n3(t), n3(ts))
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
−S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
,
n1(t) = S (n3(t), n3(ts)) , n2(t) = S (n3(t), n3(ts))
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
+S (n3(ts), n3(tf )) . (47)
As in the previous phase, expressions in (47) convert to the closed-form in the environment where
the imitation coefficients do not depend on the firm through which the new service model was
adopted:
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Corollary 5.1. When the introduction of the new service model does not cause an expansion
in the overall market potential (M=M +m), there is no intra-generational churn (poc = pnc = 0),
and imitation occurs through symmetric terms (qn =Qn > 0), the customer base trajectories for the
competing firms for t≥ ts, can be expressed as
n3(t) =
n3(ts) (qn + 3pn) + pn
(
1− e−(qn+3pn)(t−ts))(1− Ŝ (n3(ts), n3(tf ))−n3(ts))
qn + 3pn− qn (1− e−(qn+3pn)(t−ts))
(
1− Ŝ (n3(ts), n3(tf ))−n3(ts)
) ,
o1(t) =
M
M
(
1−n3(t)−
(
n3(t)−n3(ts)
pn + qnn3(ts)
)(
2pn + qnŜ (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
− Ŝ (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
,
o2(t) =
m
M
(
1−n3(t)−
(
n3(t)−n3(ts)
pn + qnn3(ts)
)(
2pn + qnŜ (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
− Ŝ (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
,
n1(t) = pn
(
n3(t)−n3(ts)
pn + qnn3(ts)
)
, n2(t) =
(
n3(t)−n3(ts)
pn + qnn3(ts)
)(
pn + qnŜ (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
+ Ŝ (n3(ts), n3(tf )) , (48)
where
Ŝ (n3(ts), n3(tf )) = pn
(
n3(ts)−n3(tf )
pn + qnn3(tf )
)
. (49)
As expected, in the case where the new service model turns out to be successful, the diffusion
dynamics described in the above Propositions have important implications for the values of terminal
customer base percentages of competing firms, n∞1 = limt→∞ n1(t), n
∞
2 = limt→∞ n2(t) and n
∞
3 =
limt→∞ n3(t). These terminal values are often viewed by firms themselves, as well as by investors
as proxies for overall profits and as indicators of the strength of firms’ competitive positions. In
particular, given the multi-product nature of most established incumbents, large market share in
a particular product often increases the perceived attractiveness of other components of the firm’s
product portfolio. In addition, a large volume of transactions in which a firm participates provides
valuable market information, which can be used for more effective cross-selling of the product
portfolio.
In the following Proposition, we describe the terminal customer base values for the different
diffusion settings described above. We find that the presence of inter-generational churn plays a
significant role in the distribution of these terminal values.
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Proposition 6. a) If there is positive intra-generational customer churn and the adoption
occurs through symmetric terms (Qn = qn), the terminal customer base values of the new entrant
and the incumbents are identical:
m∞1 =m
∞
2 =m
∞
3 =
M
3
. (50)
b) If there is no intra-generational customer churn (poc = pnc = 0), and no market expansion
resulting from the introduction of the new business model,M=M+m, the terminal customer base
value of the new entrant, n∞3 , is a root of the following equation:
n∞3 = 1−
γ
δ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(tf )
)δ
+
(
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ
− 2
)
, (51)
while the terminal customer base values of the incumbent firms are given by
n∞1 =
γ
δ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ
− 1
)
, n∞2 =
γ
δ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(tf )
)δ
− 1
)
, (52)
where n3(tf ) and n3(ts) are the customer base values for the new entrant firm at times tf and ts at
which firms 1 and 2, respectively, adopt the new service model, and γ = pn
qn
, δ = Qn
qn
. In particular,
in a homogeneous imitation setting (δ= 1), the terminal customer base values are
n∞3 =
(3γ+ 1)(γ+n3(tf ))) (γ+n3(ts))
(γ+n3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts)) + γ (2γ+n3(ts) +n3(tf ))
− γ,
n∞1 =
γ(3γ+ 1)(γ+n3(tf )))
(γ+n3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts)) + γ (2γ+n3(ts) +n3(tf ))
− γ,
n∞2 =
γ(3γ+ 1)(γ+n3(ts)))
(γ+n3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts)) + γ (2γ+n3(ts) +n3(tf ))
− γ. (53)
Figure 2 shows the terminal customer base values in the setting where both incumbents enter
at the same time, determined by the customer base of the new entrant. The two sets of curves on
this figure correspond to different relative “speeds” of the incumbent diffusion, Qn = δqn with δ= 1
and δ= 5. Note that in the case of symmetric imitation (δ= 1), the simultaneous entry of the new
entrant and of the incumbents splits the new service model market into three equal parts; on the
other hand, if incumbents wait until the new entrant captures 25% of the market before adopting,
their terminal customer base values of the new market will rise only up to around 10% each, leaving
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Figure 2 Terminal customer base values when both incumbents enter at the same time (γ = 0.05, δ= 1,5)
80% for the new entrant. As expected, the setting with fast incumbent diffusion (δ = 5) is more
forgiving to incumbent delays: incumbents can allow the new entrant to capture 15% of the total
customer base, and still catch up with it in terms of terminal customer base value. In a similar
manner, the new entrant will have to capture around half of the potential market before adoption
by incumbents in order to keep their terminal customer base values at a 10% level.
2.4. Phase IV: “Two Incumbents”
The analysis above pertains to the case where the new service model turns out to be successful. If,
however, the new model fails at t= TF , then, starting at that point in time, the only firms present
in the market are incumbents, both of them employing the old service model. Below we consider
the diffusion dynamics in such a case for t ≥ TF . The diffusion dynamics for this time period is
described by the following set of differential equations:
dmo1
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
1
)
(M−mo1−mo2) + pocmo2− pocmo1, (54)
dmo2
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
2
)
(M−mo1−mo2) + pocmo1− pocmo2, (55)
augmented by the initial conditions following from the solution of phase III equations, mo1 (TF ) and
mo2 (TF ). The dynamics expressed by (54)-(55) with these initial conditions admit a closed-form
characterization.
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Proposition 7. Consider the setting where the new model fails at t= TF , and define, for t≥ TF
I¯1(t) =
1
2poc
(
e2poc(t−TF ) 2F1
(
2poc
2po + qo
,− 1
2po + qo
; 1 +
2poc
2po + qo
;
(
−
qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)(
e−(2po+qo)(t−TF )
))
−2F1
(
2poc
2po + qo
,− 1
2po + qo
; 1 +
2poc
2po + qo
;
(
−
qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)))
, (56)
and
I¯2(t) =
1
2poc
(
e2poc(t−TF ) 2F1
(
2poc
2po + qo
,1− 1
2po + qo
; 1 +
2poc
2po + qo
;
(
−
qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)(
e−(2po+qo)(t−TF )
))
−2F1
(
2poc
2po + qo
,1− 1
2po + qo
; 1 +
2poc
2po + qo
;
(
−
qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)))
, (57)
where moi (TF ), i= 1,2 is the customer base of incumbent i at time TF , and m
o (TF ) =m
o
1 (TF ) +
mo2 (TF ). Then, the customer bases of the incumbents for t≥ TF are given by
moi (t) = e
−2poc(t−TF )
 1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)(t−TF )

1
2po+qo
× (moi (TF )
+
 1
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
 12po+qo ((poM+ (poc− po)mo (TF )) I¯1(t) + (poc− po) (M−mo (TF )) I¯2(t))
 ,
i= 1,2. (58)
The results of the Proposition 7 indicate, in particular, that limt→+∞moi (t) =
M
2
, i= 1,2: upon the
failure of the new model, the diffusion dynamics reflects the competition between the incumbents
that end up, in the long run, splitting the market equally. This result is a direct consequence of
our assumption on the symmetry of the process of adoption of the old service model.
2.5. Terminal Customer Base Values in the Settings with Asymmetric Churn
The terminal customer base values serve as important indicators of relative strength of competing
firms in settings where the new model succeeds as well as in settings where the new model fails. In
the former case, the terminal customer base values reflect the relative strength of the incumbents
under the old model, while in the latter - the relative strength of the newcomer and the incumbents
under the new model. Below we derive the expressions for the terminal customer base values in
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both cases in the general setting with asymmetric churn among the incumbents employing the old
model as well as the asymmetric churn between the incumbents and the newcomer when they all
employ the new model. In particular, we assume that the diffusion dynamics in the general setting
with asymmetric churn with three firms present is described by
dmo1
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
1
)
(M−mo1−mo2−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + p12ocmo2
−
(
p21oc + 3pn +
Qn
M (m
n
1 +m
n
2) +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
mo1, (59)
dmo2
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
2
)
(M−mo1−mo2−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + p21ocmo1
−
(
p12oc + 3pn +
Qn
M (m
n
1 +m
n
2) +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
mo2, (60)
dmn1
dt
=
(
pn +
Qn
Mm
n
1
)
(M−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + p12ncmn2 + p13ncmn3 −
(
p21nc + p
31
nc
)
mn1 , (61)
dmn2
dt
=
(
pn +
Qn
Mm
n
2
)
(M−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + p21ncmn1 + p23ncmn3 −
(
p12nc + p
32
nc
)
mn2 , (62)
dmn3
dt
=
(
pn +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
(M−mn1 −mn2 −mn3) + p31ncmn1 + p32ncmn2 −
(
p13nc + p
23
nc
)
mn3 , (63)
where pijnc > 0 is the parameter that describes the churn from the customer group that uses the new
model offered by the firm j to the customer group that uses the new model offered by firm i 6= j,
and pijoc > 0 is the parameter that describes the churn from the customer group that uses the old
model offered by the firm j to the customer group that uses the old model offered by firm i 6= j.
The terminal customer base values of competing firms are expressed by the following result.
Proposition 8. a) In a setting where the new model succeeds, the terminal customer base values
corresponding to the old service model, o∞i = limt→∞ oi(t), i = 1,2 are zero, while the terminal
customer base values corresponding to the new technology, n∞i = limt→∞ ni(t), i= 1,2,3, are given
by
n∞1 =
p12ncp
23
nc + p
13
ncp
32
nc + p
12
ncp
13
nc
p12ncp
23
nc + p
21
ncp
13
nc + p
31
ncp
12
nc + p
23
ncp
31
nc + p
13
ncp
32
nc + p
32
ncp
21
nc + p
12
ncp
13
nc + p
21
ncp
23
nc + p
31
ncp
32
nc
, (64)
n∞2 =
p21ncp
13
nc + p
23
ncp
31
nc + p
21
ncp
23
nc
p12ncp
23
nc + p
21
ncp
13
nc + p
31
ncp
12
nc + p
23
ncp
31
nc + p
13
ncp
32
nc + p
32
ncp
21
nc + p
12
ncp
13
nc + p
21
ncp
23
nc + p
31
ncp
32
nc
, (65)
n∞3 =
p32ncp
21
nc + p
31
ncp
12
nc + p
31
ncp
32
nc
p12ncp
23
nc + p
21
ncp
13
nc + p
31
ncp
12
nc + p
23
ncp
31
nc + p
13
ncp
32
nc + p
32
ncp
21
nc + p
12
ncp
13
nc + p
21
ncp
23
nc + p
31
ncp
32
nc
. (66)
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b) In the setting where the new model fails, the terminal customer base values corresponding to the
old service model are given by
o∞1 =
p21oc
p12oc + p
21
oc
, (67)
o∞2 =
p12oc
p12oc + p
21
oc
. (68)
Part b) of Proposition 8 outlines the impact of asymmetry in the inter-incumbent churn processes
on the way the market is split when all potential customers have made their adoption decisions in
the setting where the old model manages to stave off the innovation threat. If the new model fails,
the ratio of incumbents’ relative customer bases is equal to the ratio of their churn parameters. Part
a) of Proposition 8 describes an opposing setting where the new model survives and completely
replaces the old one. In this setting, the segmentation of the market dominated by the new model
follows a much more complex pattern. The terminal customer base expressions (64)-(66) reflect
the most general, and entirely asymmetric, churn dynamics between the incumbents and the new
entrant. Note that, in the trivial special case where all churn coefficients are equal, the three firms,
as expected, split the market equally. Figure 3 provides an illustration of the terminal market
coverage in the case where the churn processes between the incumbents and the new entrant are
symmetric (i.e, p13nc = p
31
nc = p
23
nc = p
32
nc = pˆ), but the churn process between the incumbents is not
(so that, in general, p12nc 6= p21nc 6= pˆ). Figure 3a looks at the subcase where the churn between the
incumbents and the new entrant is very slow (pˆ= 0.01<< p12nc = 1), while the Figure 3b describes
the subcase where the churn between the incumbents and the new entrant is very fast (pˆ= 100>>
p12nc = 1). There are two important observations that can be made in such semi-asymmetric setting.
First, the symmetry in the incumbent-new entrant churn ensures that the customer base of the
new entrant is equal to 1
3
, and is not affected by the intra-incumbent churn processes. Second, the
way the incumbents split the remaining 2
3
of the market can be strongly affected by the presence
of the new entrant. Note that, as (64)-(65) imply, for p13nc = p
31
nc = p
23
nc = p
32
nc = pˆ the ratio of the
terminal customer base values for the two incumbents is
n∞1
n∞2
=
p12nc + 2pˆ
p21nc + 2pˆ
. (69)
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Figure 3 : The terminal customer base values as functions of the incumbent churn assymetry factor
p21nc
p12nc
for different
values of new entrant-incumbent churn parameter pˆ = p13nc = p
31
nc = p
23
nc = p
32
nc: a) pˆ = 0.01, p
12
nc = 1, b)
pˆ= 100, p12nc = 1.
Comparing this expression with the ratio justified by the intra-incumbent churn processes alone,
p12nc
p21nc
, we observe that (69) is greater than p
12
nc
p21nc
if and only if p
12
nc
p21nc
< 1. Note that if p12nc < p
21
nc, the incum-
bent 1 is less “attractive” to consumers than the incumbent 2 and, therefore, has smaller terminal
customer base values in the absence of a newcomer. Thus, the presence of the new entrant allows
for the incumbent 1 to have higher terminal customer base. As (69) indicates, such moderating
effect of the new entrant becomes especially pronounced if the churn that involves the new entrant
dominates other churn processes.
3. An Empirical Example: FX market
In this section, we illustrate the application of our model by examining the empirical context
mentioned briefly in the Introduction section, namely, the foreign exchange (FX) market. Obtaining
detailed firm-level data to illustrate our model is not trivial. Most previous studies of new product
diffusion have been conducted at the category level (Libai et al. 2009a, p. 24). We have collected
our data from archival material (press releases and industry reports), and supplemented our data
with detailed interviews with senior managers in the industry.
The foreign exchange market displays four characteristic that make it appropriate context in
which to illustrate the application of our model. First, this market had a traditional service model
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with the potential to be transformed into a new one. Second, there was a new entrant that launched
the new service model. Third, incumbent firms with different sizes of customer bases existed.
Fourth, the markets displayed different adoption times for the innovation by the major and minor
firms respectively.
The major customers in the foreign exchange market are corporations such as investment man-
agement firms, pension funds and insurance firms. Customers typically use the foreign exchange
market for international trade, cross-border investments and hedging against currency risks. Tradi-
tionally, the trading on the foreign exchange market was done in an over-the-counter mode whereby
the customer had to make several phone calls to dealers to obtain quotes. Dealers, in turn, offered
both buy and sell quotes to customers. Once a price has been agreed upon, the transaction was
executed with one of the dealer banks. In the traditional process, the dealers’ business model was
based on generating revenues from the spread between buy and sell prices. Dealers are able to
charge a spread because of their ability to match buyers and sellers as well as to take on inventory
risks. Often dealers might not be able to match buyers and sellers at the same time and hence,
would need to hold the currencies in inventory until a corresponding customer is found.
The advent of the Internet enabled more efficient means for price information dissemination and
execution of trades via electronic trading technology. In this new service model, dealers post their
bid and offer prices, or customers can request quotes from multiple dealers and transact accordingly
on the electronic platform. In April 2000, Currenex, a new entrant, launched a new model of foreign
exchange trading via the Internet. Currenex started attracting customers away from the incumbent
dealer banks onto its platform. In response, the dealer banks formed two consortia to adopt the
new foreign exchange trading model. The first consortium consisted of three of the world’s largest
dealers in foreign exchange, namely Citibank, JP Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank, with the
combined share of 28.9% of total daily trading volume; the second consortium was formed by seven
smaller/minor banks with the combined daily trading volume adding up to 25.5% of the total
(Euromoney 2000). Thus, from the point of view of the adoption of the new business model the
Pac¸, Savin, and Velu: When to Adopt a Service Innovation: Nash Equilibria in a Competitive Diffusion Framework
28 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
dealer banks essentially acted like a duopoly. The consortium led by the minor banks adopted the
new business model by launching a platform called FXall in May 2001 (13 months after the new
entrant). This was then followed by the consortium led by the major banks launching a similar
platform, Atriax in June 2001 (14 months after the new entrant). Atriax, however, stopped its
operation in April 2002.
We have estimated the overall market potential M as well as the innovation and imitation
parameters using the average daily trading volume data for competing bank consortia shown in
Appendix B. Since the numbers of customer accounts are not publicly available, in our estimation
analysis we used the daily transaction volume as a proxy for the sizes of customer bases in foreign
exchange e-trading. In addition, since all of the available data estimates relate to the trading
volumes for the new service model, we have used the estimate for the total daily trading volume
at around the time of the introduction of the new model ($1 trillion, Reuters News 2001) and
the pre-innovation customer base estimates for the major and the minor incumbents to set their
respective values at M = $289 billion, and m= $255 billion, and focused on establishing the values
forM, po, qo, poc, pn, qn, Qn and pnc (8 parameters) that provide the best fit for the available data.
We established the best-fit parameters by minimizing the sum of the equally-weighted squared
deviations between the analytical and the actual customer bases values. For the fitting procedure,
we have used the discretized version of our model, with the discrete time unit equal to 1 month
to reflect the empirical data. To account for the finite time that the major incumbent invested
in the Atriax platform, we have set the customer bases values corresponding to the new model
offered by the major incumbent to 0 after April 2002, thus estimating the model where the minor
incumbent and the new entrant share the new model market. The minimization was done using
Excel Solver with ”GRG Nonlinear” option with multiple random restarts. After obtaining the
best-fit values, we have run the ”Evolutionary Solver” on the resulting values to ensure that they
cannot be improved upon. The resulting estimated values are reported in Table 2.
Figure 4 illustrates the fit between the analytical model with parameters from the Table 2 and
the empirical data for Currenex, the new entrant (Figure 4a) and FXAll, the minor incumbent
(Figure 4b).
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Parameter Estimated Value, $bn
M 544.00
Parameter Estimated Value, ×10−5 1
month
po 8.74
qo 0.23
poc 96.23
Parameter Estimated Value, ×10−5 1
month
pn 1.10
qn 7233.87
Qn 1645.64
pnc 0.00
Table 2 The best-fit parameter values.
Month
($bn)𝑚3
n ₓ  Actual
● Predicted
a)
Month
($bn)𝑚2
n
ₓ  Actual
● Predicted
b)
Figure 4 : The actual vs. predicted average daily trading volumes a) for the new entrant (Currenex), and b) for the
minor incumbent (FXAll).
Table 2 prompts several observations regarding the diffusion dynamics in the environment
described by the FX trading data. First, the introduction of a new service model has resulted, in
this environment, in a redistribution of the existing market (M=M +m). Second, the customer
base dynamics under the old service model and under the new service model appear to have very
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different features: the old model is driven mostly by innovation in the presence of a strong customer
churn, while the new model expands almost exclusively through imitation, with no customer churn.
Finally, the new entrant have a clear first-mover advantage in terms of the speed of the “imitation”
process as compared to the incumbents. In Section 5 we will use the best-fit estimates from Table 2
to conduct a numerical study of the impact of these features of the customer base dynamics on the
emerging Nash equilibria in adoption of the new service model by the incumbent firms.
4. Optimal Response Decisions and Nash Equilibria Analysis:
Successful Innovation in the Absence of Market Expansion or
Intra-Generational Churn
In this section we analyze the optimal response and the equilibrium entry-time decisions of the
incumbents. While under the general model the analysis of the equilibrium market-entry decisions
appears intractable, we managed to provide characterization of such decisions for the special setting
where the introduction of the new service model is guaranteed to be successful (i.e. PF = 0), does not
expand the overall market (M= M +m), and there is no intra-generational churn (poc = pnc = 0),
as described in Corollary 1.2 and Propositions 3 and 5.
The analysis of the competitive diffusion dynamics developed in the previous section connects
the new service model adoption decisions by two incumbent firms with the resulting customer base
trajectories. Below we adopt a perspective of one of the incumbent firms and use these trajectories
to build a framework for making the optimal adoption decisions. Without loss of generality, we
select firm 1, and assume that the time t2 at which the other incumbent, firm 2, commits to
adopting the new service model is known. We also assume that firm 1’s objective is to maximize
its discounted profits Π1 over the infinite planning horizon:
Π1 (t1, t2) =
+∞∫
0
e−βt (pioo1(t) +pinn1(t))dt, (70)
where pio(pin) is a per-unit-of-time profit contribution from each firm 1 customer using old (new)
service model, and β is the time discounting factor. Note that, in practice, the profit contributions
themselves may be affected by the respective customer base values. To maintain the tractability of
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the analysis of the adoption times, we use the simplified approach that assigns to the profit margins
constant values that reflect the average profit margins earned over a large range of customer base
values.
For simplicity, we consider the adoption times to be between 0 (“adopt immediately”) and some
maximum time tmax (“delay adoption as much as possible”). In other words, the profit maximization
problem for firm 1 can be expressed as
max
0≤t1≤tmax
Π1 (t1, t2) , (71)
so that the optimal adoption response time is defined as
topt1 = arg max
0≤t1≤tmax
Π1 (t1, t2) . (72)
The choice of tmax, while somewhat arbitrary, can be tied to the time characteristic of the customer
base dynamics of the new firm n3(t) in the first phase of the competitive diffusion: the rate of change
of n3(t), as shown in Bass (1969), peaks at T =
1
pn+qn
ln
(
qn
pn
)
and becomes negligible after 2T .
Thus, setting, for example, tmax =
3
pn+qn
ln
(
qn
pn
)
appears to be a reasonable choice. The optimization
problem (71) is well-behaved under a mild assumption on the time parameters of the underlying
dynamics:
Proposition 9. For β ≤ 3pn the profit Π1 (t1, t2) is a quasiconcave function of t1.
The assumption of Proposition 9, ensuring that the profit function of firm 1 has unique local max-
imizing adoption time, is both mild and easy-to-interpret: in order for the profit function to be
well-behaved, we require that the process of time discounting of profits proceeds at a relatively
slow rate and does not interfere with the dynamics of adoption of the new service model. Such
an assumption seems quite reasonable in cases of computer/Internet-related technology diffusions,
since it is likely that such “digital diffusions” exhibit much faster innovation dynamics than tradi-
tional ones (Rangaswamy and Gupta 1999). For example, Lilien, Rangaswamy and Van den Bulte
(2000) report the innovation parameter pn = 0.121 per year for PC adoptions in the US - as com-
pared to the average of pn = 0.037 across multiple categories of agricultural, medical equipment,
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production technology and consumer electronics products. For a diffusion similar to the PC adop-
tion, the maximum value of time discounting factor β satisfying the assumption of Proposition 9
is 3pn = 36.3% per year, which is high enough to accommodate any realistic discount rate. While
in real business settings the value of β is likely to exceed this level, our extensive numerical tests
show that the quasiconcavity of the profit function is preserved even for much higher values of time
discounting factor.
For a given value of t2, the optimal response time t
opt
1 depends on the underlying parameters
of the diffusion problem, in particular, on the values of firm 1’s initial customer base θ, as well
as the profit contributions pio and pin. The monotonicity properties of the response time t
opt
1 are
formalized by the following Proposition:
Proposition 10. The optimal response time topt1 is a non-decreasing function of the profit-
adjusted customer base pio θ
pin
.
Proposition 10 indicates that high initial customer base predisposes a firm to delay its innovation
response.
The equilibrium analysis of the adoption decisions in a competitive environment can be recast
in terms of finding a pair of Nash equilibrium adoption times t∗1 and t
∗
2 such that t
∗
1 = t
opt
1 (t
∗
2) and
t∗2 = t
opt
2 (t
∗
1). In a more general setting the equilibrium analysis may also include the endogenous
determination of the diffusion parameters. While the existence of pure equilibrium in terms of
adoption times is not guaranteed, mixed equilibrium strategies for the model we analyze do exist
for any combination of problem parameters, as implied by the continuity of our profit functions
(Gliksberg 1952; Dasgupta and Maskin 1986). Despite the absence of guarantees for the existence of
pure Nash equilibrium in the general case, the partial characterization of pure equilibria is possible
for a broad range of problem parameters:
Proposition 11. Define ρ1 =
pioθ
pin
and ρ2 =
pio(1−θ)
pin
.
a) Suppose that ρ1 ≤ 1 and ρ2 ≤ 1. Then, t∗1 = t∗2 = 0.
b) Suppose that β < pn(qn+3pn)
qn+2pn
and ρ1 ≥ 1
1− β(qn+2pn)
pn(qn+3pn)
, ρ2 ≥ 1
1− β(qn+2pn)
pn(qn+3pn)
. Then, t∗1 = t
∗
2 = tmax.
c) Suppose that β < pn(qn+3pn)
pn+2pn
and ρ1 ≥ 1
1− β(qn+2pn)
pn(qn+3pn)
, ρ2 ≤ 1. Then, t∗1 = tmax and t∗2 = 0.
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Figure 5 Nash equilibria with respect to new service model adoption times (β = pn = 1.3× 10−4, qn = 0).
The statements of Proposition 11 are illustrated on Figure 5 for the case of 2β = pn = 1.3× 10−4,
qn = 0. For this parameter combination,
(
1− β(qn+2pn)
pn(qn+3pn)
)−1
= 1.5, and Proposition 11 identifies the
Nash equilibria for a wide range of problem settings. Clearly, in the cases not covered by the
statements of Proposition 11, the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and the values of
the matching adoption response times have to be established through the numerical evaluation of
the profit functions of competing firms. Note that the “grey areas” of the parameter space not
covered by Proposition 11 shrink as the time discount factor β goes down, reflecting the growing
attractiveness of the “delay as much as you can” option for both incumbents. In particular, in the
limit of β→ 0, Proposition 11 completely describes the adoption behavior of both incumbents for
any combination of problem parameters. Table 3 provides a detailed illustration of this limit. Note
that the types of possible adoption equilibria in this case are determined by the relative discount
offered to customers switching to the new business model, pin
pio
. In particular, in the “deep discount”
case (pin
pio
≤ 0.5) the major incumbent always delays its adoption as much as possible, while the
minor incumbent uses the “delay as much as possible” approach when the initial customer base
of the major incumbent is not too high (θ ≤ 1− pin
pio
), and the “ adopt now” approach otherwise.
On the other hand, when the new model does not offer a significant discount (pin
pio
> 0.5), the minor
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Profit Discount, pin
pio
Market Dominance, θ Moderate
(
pin
pio
> 0.5
)
Deep
(
pin
pio
≤ 0.5
)
Moderate
(
θ≤max
(
pin
pio
,1− pin
pio
))
Major Incumbent-“Now” Major Incumbent-“Delay”
Minor Incumbent-“Now” Minor Incumbent-“Delay”
Strong
(
θ >max
(
pin
pio
,1− pin
pio
))
Major Incumbent-“Delay” Major Incumbent-“Delay”
Minor Incumbent-“Now” Minor Incumbent-“Now”
Table 3 Adoption Nash-equilibrium strategies in the absence of time discounting.
incumbent adopts the new model immediately, while the policy of the major incumbent changes
from “adopt now” in settings where its market dominance is limited (θ ≤ pin
pio
) to “delay as much
as possible” when it is pronounced (θ > pin
pio
). The results of Proposition 11 indicate that in the
business settings where the customer base values of competing firms follow Bass-like dynamics
introduced in Section 2, major incumbents (dominant firms) are prone to delays in innovation. An
intuitive, simple nature of the equilibria described in Table 3 offers competitors an appealing recipe
for building their adoption strategies in settings where the time discounting factors are negligible.
5. Nash Equilibria Adoption Times in the FX Market: A Numerical
Study
The analytical results presented in Section 4 relate to the special setting where the innovation is
guaranteed to be successful, does not affect the overall market potential, and where the customer
base dynamics exhibits negligible intra-generational churn. The FX market example introduced in
Section 3 describes an environment without the market expansion upon the introduction of new
service model, no intra-generational churn in the diffusion dynamics of the new service model, but
where the intra-generational churn in the dynamics of the old service model is prominent. For such
a setting we have conducted numerical tests of the Nash equilibria in the adoption times for the new
service model. In particular, we have used the diffusion parameters and the market size estimates
reported in Table 2 and varied the parameters that describe the incumbents’ beliefs about the risk
associated with the new service model, i.e., their beliefs regarding the probability and the time of
its potential “failure”.
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Note that, in addition to the diffusion, market size, and risk parameters, the Nash equilibrium
adoption times are determined by the ratio pin
pio
of the profit margins associated with the old and
the new service model, as well as the time discount factor β. We have estimated the profit margin
associated with the the traditional, phone-based, business model, pio, to be 11% by averaging the
profit margins for 1998-2000 from the 10-k reports for the Bank of New York and Merrill Lynch
(Bank of New York Mellon 2001, Merrill Lynch 2002). The interviews we have conducted with
senior executives in the industry have confirmed a significant reduction in the profit margin upon
switching to the online trading model, with pin being about 5%. In our numerical tests, we have
used these estimates for the pio and pin, respectively, resulting in the ratio of
pin
pio
= 45.45%. For
the time-discounting factor, we have used β = 0.01 (per month), corresponding to 12% annual
discounting rate.
In calculating the Nash equilibria adoption times, we have assumed that each incumbent commits
to entering at a particular (integer) month value between the launch of the new model and the
finite horizon of tmax = 30 months. We have selected the moderately high finite horizon value to
ensure that the numerical search for the Nash equilibria can be accomplished in reasonable time.
For each combination of problem parameters reported below, the Nash equilibrium in incumbent
adoption times exists and is unique when the incumbents’ choices are limited to the set of integers
between 0 and tmax.
Figure 6 reports the Nash equilibrium incumbent adoption times as functions of the “failure”
probability PF for two fixed values of the “failure” time, TF = 15 and TF = 60. We have selected
these two values to illustrate the difference in incumbents’ responses to the failure that occurs
“early” (TF < tmax) and to the one that occurs “late” (TF > tmax). The adoption-time Nash equilib-
ria described in Figure 6 reflect a rather interesting competitive dynamics among the incumbents.
Note the “discontinuity” in the Nash equilibrium pattern observed in Figure 6a that describes the
case of an early failure (TF = 15 < tmax). In this setting, when PF = 1, i.e., when the failure is
certain, both incumbents react to such early and certain failure by abandoning the adoption of
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Nash Equilibrium 
Adoption Times (months)
𝑇𝐹 = 15
a)
𝑡1
∗
(“major” incumbent)
𝑡2
∗
(“minor” incumbent)
𝑃𝐹
Nash Equilibrium 
Adoption Times (months)
𝑇𝐹 = 60
b)
𝑡1
∗
(“major” incumbent)
𝑡2
∗
(“minor” incumbent)
𝑃𝐹
Figure 6 : The Nash equilibrium adoption times for the two incumbents in the FX example as functions of the
failure probability PF for the determinsitic failure times TF = 15 (a), and TF = 60 (b).
the innovation. However, as soon as there appears to be a finite probability for the innovation to
survive, both incumbents immediately hedge by committing to an adoption at the potential failure
time TF = 15. When the failure probability is reduced further, there emerges a range of probability
values such that the “minor” incumbent favors immediate adoption, while the “major” incumbent
commits to a delayed adoption at TF = 15. Finally, as the failure becomes even less likely, both
incumbents choose immediate adoption. In our numerical tests, a similar Nash equilibrium pattern
is observed for any fixed 0<TF < tmax.
Figure 6b illustrates a corresponding monotonicity in the incumbents’ responses when failure,
if it occurs, happens fairly late, beyond the allowable horizon of incumbents’ responses. In this
case, incumbents cannot commit to adopting at TF , and the “adopt now” response directly follows
“never adopt” response as the survival of the new service model becomes increasingly likely.
We observed a similar response pattern for all values of TF > tmax, with the region of “never
adopt” response shrinking as the failure time becomes more distant. In particular, for TF ≥ 115,
both incumbents choose “adopt now” response irrespective of the probability of failure. For such
high values of TF incumbents behave as if failure does not occur at all and immediately move to
protect their profit streams.
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Nash Equilibrium 
Adoption Times (months)
(months)𝐸[𝑇𝐹]
𝑃𝐹 = 0.8
𝑡1
∗
(“major” incumbent)
𝑡2
∗
(“minor” incumbent)
Figure 7 : The Nash equilibrium adoption times for the two incumbents in the FX example as functions of the
expected failure time E[TF ] for the geometric distribution of the failure time period (PF = 0.8).
Figure 6 illustrates the properties of the Nash equilibria in settings where the failure of the new
model, if it occurs, happens at a given time period. A more interesting setting is shown in Figure 7,
where the time-to-failure, if it occurs, follows the variant of geometric distribution, i.e.,
P (TF = k) = p (1− p)k , k= 6,12,18,24, ... (73)
Note that, under the probability distribution (73), the failure of the new model can occur at 6-
month increments (i.e., at t = 6,12,18,24, ..., months), and is “memoryless”. The latter feature
of this distribution provides an appropriate match to the open-loop nature of the incumbents’
decision process on when to adopt an innovation. In other words, under the geometric time-to-
failure distribution, the incumbents cannot improve their decision making process by adopting
a dynamic, “closed-loop” policy that would entail making an adoption decision based on time
elapsed since the introduction of the new service model. Figure 7 shows the Nash equilibrium
adoption times for the incumbents as a function of the expected time-to-failure for the setting
where the failure is quite likely (PF = 0.8). This high value of the failure probability reflects an
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important outcome we have observed: both incumbents choose “immediate” adoption (i.e, the Nash
equilibrium is t∗1 = t
∗
2 = 0) for all values of E[TF ] as long as the failure probability PF is low. Hence,
in Figure 7 we report the results for the value of PF that results, at least for some values of TF , in
“delayed-adoption” Nash equilibria.
There are three key observations that we can make based on the results shown in Figure 7.
First, the insight outlined in Proposition 10 continues to hold in a more general setting of the FX
market example. In particular, the customer base dominance in terms of the old model translates
into “inertia” in adopting the new service model: the “major” incumbent never leads in terms of
adoption of the new service model, and either enters simultaneously with the “minor” incumbent,
or lags behind it.
Second, in the FX market setting, incumbents must estimate the failure of the new model to be
quite likely to abandon the “immediate adoption” equilibrium. In particular, for PF = 0.8 (i.e., for
the setting where the failure of the new model is likely, but not certain), we observe an emergence
of the “delay equilibria” when the expected failure time is neither too small nor too large.
Third, the equilibrium adoption responses of the incumbents exhibit a clear non-monotone pat-
tern as TF grows. In particular, when the failure is expected in a “near future”, the marginal
impact of failure delays on the adoption delays is positive, as the incumbents react by increasing
the protection of their old customer bases and delaying their adoption decisions. However, when
the TF reaches a particular threshold, the failure of the new model, even if it happens with high
probability, is late enough to lose most of its impact. From the incumbents’ perspective, the situa-
tion begins to look more and more like the setting where the new model succeeds, and this forces
the incumbents to reverse their assessments and lean towards the “immediate” adoptions.
As mentioned in Section 3, in the FX market example the “minor” incumbent has adopted the
new model at t2 = 13, and the “major” incumbent - at t1 = 14 months. These adoption times are
close to the Nash equilibria in the setting where incumbents assign a high probability of failure to
the new model, expecting the failure to occur at around a two-year mark.
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6. Conclusions and Managerial Implications
The question of when an incumbent firm should cannibalize the customer base from an existing
service model as a result of adopting a new service model introduced by a “new entrant” firm
is of major importance in a number of business settings. In particular, is market dominance of
the incumbent a hindrance or an incentive for an early adoption? The theoretical and empirical
literature on this issue provides conflicting answers. Our paper addresses the limitations of the
existing literature and provides a detailed analytical account of customer adoption dynamics and
how it might affect firms’ profits and influence innovation adoption decisions. Our approach to
describing customer base trajectories extends the classical Bass adoption dynamics to the setting
where two incumbent firms compete with an entrant proposing a new service model.
In our analysis, we model a setting that includes the market expansion upon the introduction
of the new service model, as well as the intra-generational customer churn. We derive closed-form
expressions for the customer base trajectories of competing firms in two special settings. In the
first setting, we assume that the introduction of the innovation leads to an expansion of the market
potential and the diffusion dynamics includes intra-generational customer churn. In the second
setting, we assume that there is no intra-generational churn and the market potential remains
unchanged upon the introduction of innovation, but there are brand awareness effects whereby the
incumbents enjoy a larger customer imitation effect compared to the new entrant. For the latter
setting, we analyze the optimal adoption response decisions and the Nash equilibria adoption times.
Our results show that under the Bass-like competitive dynamics, the market dominance translates
into lagged response to innovation as long as the size of the pre-innovation customer base is the
main distinguishing feature between the incumbents.
One important aspect of our work is the analysis of potential risks associated with the new
service model. In particular, we analyze, analytically, the diffusion dynamics of the two incumbents
following the new model failure, and, numerically, the Nash equilibrium adoption decisions for the
incumbents that share estimates for the probability of failure of the new service model and the
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distribution of time at which such failure may occur. For the latter investigation, we use the actual
trading volume data from the FX markets to identify the best-fit diffusion dynamics parameters
and to study the effects of the likelihood and the imminence of the new model failure on the
responses of the incumbents. Our results, in particular, help to quantify an important connection
between the delays in the adoption of the new business model and the incumbents’ perception of
the expected duration for the new model to remain on the market.
The model we propose and the analysis we conduct have several managerial implications. First,
for managers it is important to distinguish between innovation and imitation effects of not only
one’s own firm but also those of competitors when introducing new products, services and business
models. Managers have increasingly come to realize the importance of market research and ways
to affect interpersonal communications, such as word of mouth, especially in a world where social
media is increasingly playing a major role. However, as a result of easier data availability, firms
often focus on measuring and understanding their own innovation and imitation effects as part
of marketing communications but less on those of their competitors. In particular, the brand
awareness effect often comes through the imitation effect, whereby communication about the new
adoption experience from an existing customer of the firm might have a stronger effect on the
willingness of other customers to switch to the innovation introduced by the firm, as compared to
the imitation effect coming from customers of a new entrant. Managers need to evaluate fully the
relative influence of these two effects and use this knowledge for prediction and planning on when
to adopt an innovation.
Second, it is important for managers to have reliable estimates of the churn rate for existing
services. Often, customers switch between incumbent firms that provide an old service even when
new one is launched. Some of these customers may churn and choose a different service provider due
to selection or quality-related reasons. This customer switching pattern creates intra-generational
churn, which is an important factor influencing customer base trajectories and profits for the
competing firms.
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Third, as the introduction of innovation can result in market expansion for both the existing
service model and the new service model, managers need to understand how the various sources of
interpersonal communication influence such market expansion. While a number of previous studies
on the subject of innovation have looked at the implications of a new entrant on the incumbent’s
incentive to innovate (Schumpeter 1942; Ghemawat 1991; Chandy and Tellis 2000), we adopt a
more nuanced view of how the effect of the new entrant works through the incentives of other
incumbent firms. In our analysis, the adoption decision of other incumbent firms is just as important
as that of the new entrant. Managers can use our model to assess changes taking place in the
diffusion process because of adoption by another incumbent firm and to analyze possible “what if”
scenarios to understand the impact of their actions on the terminal sizes of their customer bases
and profitability.
In the present paper we focused on the diffusion dynamics and assumed a pre-set marketing-mix
environment and a symmetry in the incumbents diffusion parameters. One promising extension
to our work is to model the influence of dynamically set prices on the resulting adoption-time
Nash equilibria. Another avenue for future research relates to the “now” or “never” innovation
adoption prescription described by Wilson and Norton (1989) and refined by Mahajan and Muller
(1996). In particular, whether such a policy remains an optimal response for competing firms in
the presence of intra-generational churn and post-innovation market expansion is an important
question for further investigation. Finally, the important question we left outside of the scope of
our present investigation is how robust the inertia in adopting the innovation is in settings with
asymmetric incumbents. We anticipate that a reversal of such market entry order can only be
observed in settings where the pre-innovation customer base asymmetry is complemented by a
substantial additional asymmetry in the incumbents’ diffusion parameters. Identifying such settings
is an important future step in characterizing competitive market-entry equilibria.
In our analysis we have assumed that the competing firms have ample capacity to handle the
consumer demand. It is possible, however, especially in the case of the new entrant, that the
Pac¸, Savin, and Velu: When to Adopt a Service Innovation: Nash Equilibria in a Competitive Diffusion Framework
42 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
limited ability to accommodate growing demand may slow down the process of innovation diffusion
(Balakrishnan and Pathak 2014). Extending our analysis to constrained-capacity settings is a
promising direction for future research.
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Appendices for “When to Adopt a Service Innovation: Nash Equilibria
in a Competitive Diffusion Framework”
Appendix A: Proofs of Analytical Results
Proof of Proposition 1
The Bass-like form of mn3(t) (4) is obtained by directly integrating (3) with the initial condition
mn3(0) = 0. Let us denote m
tot(t) =mo1(t) +m
o
2(t) +m
n
3(t). Then, adding equations (1)-(3), we get
dmtot
dt
=
(
2po + pn + qo
mtot
M +
(
qn− qo
M
)
mn3
)
(M−mtot) . (A1)
Denoting X(t) = MM−mtot , we can rewrite (A1) as
dX
dt
− f(t)X = −qo with f (t) = 2po + pn + qo +(
qn−qo
M
)
mn3(t) and the initial condition X(0) =
M
M−m−M . The solution to the latter equation with
this initial condition is given by
X(t) =
 M
M−m−M − qo
t∫
0
dτ exp
− τ∫
0
f(u)du
 exp
 t∫
0
f(τ)dτ
 . (A2)
Note that
t∫
0
f(τ)dτ
=
t∫
0
(
2po + pn + qo +
(
qn− qo
M
)
mn3(τ)
)
dτ = (2po + pn + qn) t+
(
qn− qo
qn
)
log
(
qne
−(qn+pn)t + pn
qn + pn
)
, (A3)
and
t∫
0
dτ exp
− τ∫
0
f(u)du

=
(
1 + qn
pn
)(1− qoqn )
2po + pn + qn
×
 2F1
(
2po+pn+qn
qn+pn
,1− qo
qn
; 2(po+pn+qn)
qn+pn
;− qn
pn
)
− exp (− (2po + pn + qn) t)
×2F1
(
2po+pn+qn
qn+pn
,1− qo
qn
; 2(po+pn+qn)
qn+pn
;− qn
pn
exp (− (pn + qn) t)
)
 ,(A4)
where 2F1(a, b; c;x) =
∑+∞
n=0
(a)n(b)n
n!(c)n
xn is the hypergeometric function. Using (5), we get
X(t) =
 MM−m−M − F̂I (po, pn, qo, qn, t) qo
(
1 + qn
pn
)(1− qoqn )
2po + pn + qn
( qn + pne(qn+pn)t(qn + pn)e(qn+pn)t
)( qn−qoqn )
e((2po+pn+qn)t),
(A5)
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and
mtot(t) =M
1−
exp (− (2po + pn + qn) t)
(
qn+pne
(qn+pn)t
(qn+pn)e(qn+pn)t
)−( qn−qoqn )(
M
M−m−M −
qo(1+ qnpn )
(1− qoqn )
2po+pn+qn
F̂I (po, pn, qo, qn, t)
)
 . (A6)
Now, using (7), defining m−(t) =mo1(t)−mo2(t) and subtracting (2) from (1), we get
dm−(t)
dt
=
(
−2poc− pn + qo− qoĜI (po, pn, qo, qn, t)− qnMm
n
3
)
m−(t), (A7)
with the initial condition m−(0) =M −m. The solution to (A7) with this initial condition is
m−(t) =
(M −m) (qn + pn) exp ((qo− 2poc) t)
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
e(−qo
∫ t
0 ĜI (po,pn,qo,qn,τ)dτ) = ĤI (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t) . (A8)
Given that mo1(t) +m
o
2(t) =m
tot(t)−mn3(t) =MĜ (po, pn, qo, qn, t)−mn3(t), we get (9).
Proof of Corollary 1.1
The customer base of the new entrant, mn3(t), remains identical to that in Proposition 1. Plugging
in qo = 0 into equation (A1) we get
dmtot
dt
=
(
2po + pn +
qn
Mm
n
3
)
(M−mtot) . (A9)
with the initial condition mtot(0) =m+M . The solution to (A9) with this initial condition is
mtot(t) =M− (M−m−M)(qn + pn)e
−2pot
qn + pne(qn+pn)t
. (A10)
Using, m−(t) = mo1(t) − mo2(t) and plugging in qo = 0 into (A7), we get dm
−(t)
dt
=(−2poc− pn− qnMmn3)m−(t), with the initial condition m−(0) = M −m. The solution to these is
m−(t) = (M−m)(qn+pn)e
−2poct
qn+pne(qn+pn)t
. Given that mo1(t) +m
o
2(t) =m
tot(t)−mn3(t), we obtain (10).
Proof of Corollary 1.2
The Bass-like form of mn3(t) remains identical to that in Proposition 1. Plugging in the conditions
of Corollary 1.2 into (1)-(2), we have
dmo1
dt
= −pnmo1−
qn
Mm
n
3m
o
1,
dmo2
dt
=−pnmo2−
qn
Mm
n
3m
o
2. (A11)
Dividing the first equation in (A11) by the second one, and integrating the result with with the
initial conditions mo1 =M and m
o
2 =m, we obtain m
o
2(t) =m
o
1(t)
(
m
M
)
. Combining this with mo1(t)+
mo2(t) +m
n
3(t) =M, we get mo1(t) =
(
M
M
)
(M−mn3(t)) and mo2(t) =
(
m
M
)
(M−mn3(t)).
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Proof of Proposition 2
Assuming Qn = qn, we denote n(t) =m
n
2(t) +m
n
3(t). Then, adding (14)-(15), we get
dn
dt
=
(
2pn +
qn
Mn
)
(M−n) . (A12)
Integrating (A12), with the initial condition n(tf ) = m
n
3(tf ) =M
(
1− qn+pn
qn+pne(qn+pn)t
)
, we get the
Bass-like form of n(t) =M
(
1− 2pn+qn
αe
(2pn+qn)(t−tf )+qn
)
, where α = (2pn+qn)(qn+pne
(pn+qn)tf )
pn+qn
− qn. Let
a(t) =mn3(t)−mn2(t). Then, subtracting (14) from (15), we get
da
dt
= a
(
−2pnc + qn− qnMn(t)
)
. (A13)
Solving (A13) with the initial condition a(tf ) =m
n
3(tf ), we get a(t) =
mn3(tf)e
(2(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−tf )(α+qn)
αe
(2pn+qn)(t−tf )+qn
.
Combining this with mn2(t) +m
n
3(t) = n(t) and, m
n
3(t)−mn2(t) = a(t), we get the expressions for
mn2(t) and m
n
3(t). Next, denote m
tot(t) =mo1(t) +m
o
2(t) +m
n
2(t) +m
n
3(t). Then, adding equations
(12)-(15), we get
dmtot
dt
=
(
2po + 2pn + qo
mtot
M +
(
qn− qo
M
)
mn3
)
(M−mtot) . (A14)
Denoting X(t) = MM−mtot , we can rewrite (A14) as
dX
dt
=Xf(t)− qo, (A15)
with f (t) =
(
2po + 2pn + qo +
(qn−qo)
M n(t)
)
and the initial condition X(tf ) =
M
M−MĜI(po,pn,qo,qn,tf)
.
The solution to (A15) with this initial condition is given by
X(t) =

M
M−MĜI (po, pn, qo, qn, tf )
− qo
t∫
tf
dτe
−
τ∫
tf
f(u)du
e
t∫
tf
f(τ)dτ
. (A16)
Note that
t∫
tf
f(τ)dτ =
t∫
tf
(
2po + 2pn + qo +
(
qn− qo
M
)
n(τ)
)
dτ
= (2po + 2pn + qn) (t− tf ) +
(
qn− qo
qn
)
log
(
qne
−(qn+2pn)(τ−tf ) +α
qn +α
)
, (A17)
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and
t∫
tf
dτe
−
τ∫
tf
f(u)du
=
t∫
tf
dτe−(2po+2pn+qn)(τ−tf )
(
qn +α
qne
−(qn+2pn)(τ−tf ) +α
)( qn−qoqn )
=
α+ qn
α(2po + 2pn + qn)

2F1
(
1, 2po+2pn+qn
2pn+qn
+ qo
qn
; 2(po+2pn+qn)
2pn+qn
;− qn
α
)
−e−(2po+2pn+qn)(t−tf )
(
α+qne
−(2pn+qn)(t−tf )
α+qn
) qo
qn
× 2F1
(
1, 2po+2pn+qn
2pn+qn
+ qo
qn
; 2(po+2pn+qn)
2pn+qn
;− qn
α
e−(2pn+qn)(t−tf )
)
 , (A18)
where 2F1(a, b; c;x) is the hypergeometric function. Using (20), we get
X(t) =
(
1
1−ĜI (po, pn, qo, qn, tf )
− qo (α+ qn)
α(2po + 2pn + qn)
F̂II (po, pn, qo, qn, t)
)
×
(
α+ qne
−(qn+2pn)(t−tf )
α+ qn
)( qn−qoqn )
exp ((2po + 2pn + qn) (t− tf )) , (A19)
and
mtot(t) =M
1− e−(2po+2pn+qn)(t−tf )
(
(qn+α)e
(qn+2pn)(t−tf )
qn+αe
(qn+2pn)(t−tf )
)( qn−qoqn )(
1
1−ĜI(po,pn,qo,qn,tf)
− qo(α+qn)
α(2po+2pn+qn)
F̂II (po, pn, qo, qn, t)
)
 . (A20)
Now, using (21), defining m−(t) =mo1(t)−mo2(t) and subtracting (13) from (12), we get
dm−(t)
dt
=
(
−2poc− 2pn + qo− qoĜII (po, pn, qo, qn, t)− qnMn(t)
)
m−(t), (A21)
with the initial condition m−(tf ) = ĤI (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, tf ). The solution to (A21) with this initial
condition is given by
m−(t) =
ĤI (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, tf ) (α+ qn)e
(qo−2poc)(t−tf)
qn +αe
(qn+2pn)(t−tf ) e
−qo
∫ t
tf
ĜII (po,pn,qo,qn,τ)dτ
= ĤII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t) . (A22)
Combining the above with mo1(t) +m
o
2(t) = m
tot(t)− n(t), we get the expressions for mo1(t) and
mo2(t).
Proof of Corollary 2.1
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The customer base of the new entrant, mn3(t), and that of the second incumbent’s new business
model, mn2(t), remain identical to those in Proposition 2. Plugging in qo = 0 into equation (A14)
we get
dmtot
dt
=
(
2po + 2pn +
qn
Mn(t)
)
(M−mtot) . (A23)
Given the initial condition mtot(tf ) =M− (M−m−M)(2pn+qn)e
−2potf
qn+α
, the solution to (A23) is
mtot(t) =M− (M−m−M)(2pn + qn)e
−2pot
qn +αe
(qn+2pn)(t−tf ) . (A24)
Using, m−(t) =mo1(t)−mo2(t) and plugging in qo = 0 into equation (A21), we get
dm−(t)
dt
=
(
−2poc− 2pn− qnMn(t)
)
m−(t), (A25)
with the initial condition m−(tf ) =
(M−m)(qn+pn)e−2poctf
qn+pne
(qn+pn)tf
. The solution to (A25) with this initial
condition is given by m−(t) = (M−m)(qn+2pn)e
−2poct
qn+αe
(qn+2pn)(t−tf ) . Given that m
o
1(t) +m
o
2(t) = m
tot(t)− n(t), we
get the expressions for mo1(t) and m
o
2(t).
Proof of Proposition 3
Plugging in the conditions of Proposition 3 into the diffusion equations (12)-(15), and using (??)
we get:
do1
dt
= −2pno1−Qnn2o1− qnn3o1, (A26)
do2
dt
= −2pno2−Qnn2o2− qnn3o2, (A27)
dn2
dt
= pn(o1 + o2) +Qnn2(o1 + o2), (A28)
dn3
dt
= pn(o1 + o2) + qnn3(o1 + o2), (A29)
with the initial conditions:
o1(tf ) = θ
(
qn + pn
qn + pne
(qn+pn)tf
)
, (A30)
o2(tf ) = (1− θ)
(
qn + pn
qn + pne
(qn+pn)tf
)
, (A31)
n2(tf ) = 0, (A32)
n3(tf ) = 1− qn + pn
qn + pne
(qn+pn)tf
. (A33)
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Dividing (A26) by (A27), we get
do1
o1
=
do2
o2
. (A34)
Using the initial conditions (A30) and (A31), we obtain, as in phase I,
o2(t) = o1(t)
(
1− θ
θ
)
. (A35)
Similarly, dividing (A28) by (A29), we have
dn2
pn +Qnn2
=
dn3
pn + qnn3
. (A36)
For qn > 0, integrating (A36) with initial conditions (A32) and (A33) yields
n2(t) =
pn
Qn
((
pn + qnn3(t)
pn + qnn3(tf )
)Qn
qn
− 1
)
. (A37)
Similarly, when qn = 0, integration of (A36) with initial conditions (A32) and (A33) yields
n2(t) =
pn
Qn
(
e
Qn
pn (n3(t)−n3(tf ))− 1
)
. (A38)
Combining (A37) and (A29) with the conservation of market potential equation o1(t) + o2(t) +
n2(t) +n3(t) = 1, we obtain
dn3
dt
= (pn + qnn3)
(
1− pn
Qn
((
pn + qnn3(t)
pn + qnn3(tf )
)Qn
qn
− 1
)
−n3
)
. (A39)
Using the definition (28), we get
t− tf =
n3(t)∫
n3(tf )
dy
(pn + qny) (1−S1(y)− y) . (A40)
Combining (A40) with (A35) and o1(t) + o2(t) +n2(t) +n3(t) = 1, we get (29).
Proof of Corollary 3.1
For Qn = qn, (28) becomes
S1 (x) =
pn
qn
((
pn + qnx
pn + qnn3(tf )
)
− 1
)
. (A41)
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Then, (A40) can be expressed as
t− tf =
n3(t)∫
n3(tf )
(pn + qnn3(tf ))dy
(pn + qny)
(
pn
(
1− pn
qn
)
+ (pn + qn)n3(tf )− (2pn + qnn3(tf ))y
) , (A42)
or
n3(t) =A−
pn
qn
+A( pn
qn
+n3(tf )
A−n3(tf )
)
exp
(
qn(2pn+qnn3(tf ))( pnqn +A)(t−tf)
(pn+qnn3(tf ))
)
+ 1
. (A43)
where
A=
pn
(
1− pn
qn
)
+ (pn + qn)n3(tf )
2pn + qnn3(tf )
. (A44)
Using n2(t) = S1 (n3(t)), we get
n2(t) =
pn
qn
((
pn + qnn3(t)
pn + qnn3(tf )
)
− 1
)
. (A45)
Now, since o1(t) + o2(t) +n2(t) +n3(t) = 1, and o2(t) = o1(t)
(
1−θ
θ
)
, we get
o1(t)
θ
+
pn
qn
((
pn + qnn3(t)
pn + qnn3(tf )
)
− 1
)
+n3(t) = 1, (A46)
or, equivalently, o1(t) = θ
(
1−n3(t)− pnqn
((
pn+qnn3(t)
pn+qnn3(tf )
)
− 1
))
, o2(t) =
(1−θ)
θ
o1(t).
Proof of Proposition 4
Throughout the proof, we use Qn = qn. Denoting n(t) =m
n
1(t) +m
n
2(t) +m
n
3(t) and adding (33)-
(35), we get
dn
dt
=
(
3pn +
qn
Mn
)
(M−n) . (A47)
Similar to the analysis in previous phases, we get n(t) =M
(
1− 3pn+qn
λe(3pn+qn)(t−ts)+qn
)
, where λ =
(3pn+qn)(qn+αe
(2pn+qn)(ts−tf))
2pn+qn
−qn. Denoting â(t) =mn3(t)−mn2(t), and subtracting (35) from (34), we
get
dâ
dt
= â
(
−3pnc + qn− qnMn(t)
)
. (A48)
Solving (A48) with the initial condition â(ts) = m
n
3(ts) − mn2(ts), we get â(t) =
(mn3(ts)−mn2(ts))e(3(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−ts)(λ+qn)
λe(3pn+qn)(t−ts)+qn
. Similarly, let b̂(t) =mn2(t)−mn1(t). Subtracting equation (33)
from (34) for Qn = qn, we get
db̂
dt
= b̂
(
−3pnc + qn− qnMn(t)
)
. (A49)
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Solving (A49) with the initial condition b̂(ts) =m
n
2(ts), we get b̂(t) =
mn2(ts)e
(3(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−ts)(λ+qn)
λe(3pn+qn)(t−ts)+qn
.
Combining the above with mn1(t)+m
n
2(t)+m
n
3(t) = n(t), m
n
3(t)−mn2(t) = â(t), and, mn2(t)−mn1(t) =
b̂(t) we get the expressions for mn1(t), m
n
2(t) and m
n
3(t). Further, let m
tot(t) = mo1(t) + m
o
2(t) +
mn1(t) +m
n
2(t) +m
n
3(t). Then, adding equations (31)-(35), we get
dmtot
dt
=
(
2po + 3pn + qo
mtot
M +
(
qn− qo
M
)
n(t)
)
(M−mtot) . (A50)
Denoting X(t) = MM−mtot , we can rewrite (A50) as
dX
dt
=Xf(t)− qo, (A51)
with f (t) =
(
2po + 3pn + qo +
(qn−qo)
M n(t)
)
and the initial condition X(tf ) =
M
M−MĜII (po,pn,qo,qn,ts)
.
The solution to (A51) with this initial condition is given by
X(t) =

M
M−MĜII (po, pn, qo, qn, ts)
− qo
t∫
ts
dτe
−
τ∫
ts
f(u)du
e
t∫
ts
f(τ)dτ
. (A52)
Note that
t∫
tf
f(τ)dτ =
t∫
tf
(
2po + 3pn + qo +
(
qn− qo
M
)
n(τ)
)
dτ
= (2po + 3pn + qn) (t− ts) +
(
qn− qo
qn
)
log
(
qne
−(qn+3pn)(τ−ts) +λ
qn +λ
)
, (A53)
and
t∫
ts
dτe
−
τ∫
ts
f(u)du
=
t∫
tf
dτe−(2po+3pn+qn)(τ−ts)
(
qn +λ
qne−(qn+3pn)(τ−ts) +λ
)( qn−qoqn )
=
λ+ qn
λ(2po + 3pn + qn)

2F1
(
1, 2po+3pn+qn
3pn+qn
+ qo
qn
; 2(po+3pn+qn)
3pn+qn
;− qn
λ
)
−e−(2po+3pn+qn)(t−ts)
(
λ+qne
−(3pn+qn)(t−ts )
λ+qn
) qo
qn
× 2F1
(
1, 2po+3pn+qn
3pn+qn
+ qo
qn
; 2(po+3pn+qn)
3pn+qn
;− qn
λ
e−(3pn+qn)(t−ts)
)
 , (A54)
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where 2F1(a, b; c;x) is the hypergeometric function. Using (40), we get
X(t) =
(
1
1−ĜII (po, pn, qo, qn, ts)
− qo (λ+ qn)
λ(2po + 3pn + qn)
F̂III (po, pn, qo, qn, t)
)
×
(
λ+ qne
−(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
λ+ qn
)( qn−qoqn )
exp ((2po + 3pn + qn) (t− ts)) , (A55)
and
mtot(t) =M
1− e−(2po+3pn+qn)(t−ts)
(
(qn+λ)e
(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
qn+λe(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
)( qn−qoqn )(
1
1−ĜII (po,pn,qo,qn,ts)
− qo(λ+qn)
λ(2po+3pn+qn)
F̂III (po, pn, qo, qn, t)
)
 . (A56)
Now, using (41), defining m−(t) =mo1(t)−mo2(t) and subtracting (32) from (31), we get
dm−(t)
dt
=
(
−2poc− 3pn + qo− qoĜIII (po, pn, qo, qn, t)− qnMn(t)
)
m−(t), (A57)
with the initial condition m−(ts) = ĤII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, ts). The solution to (A57) with this initial
condition is given by m−(t) = ĤIII (po, poc, pn, qo, qn, t). Combining the above with mo1(t) +m
o
2(t) =
mtot(t)−n(t), we get the expressions for mo1(t) and mo2(t).
Proof of Corollary 4.1
The customer base of the new entrant, mn3(t), and those for the incumbents’ new business models,
mn1(t), m
n
2(t), remain identical to those in Proposition 4. Plugging in qo = 0 into (A50) we get
dmtot
dt
=
(
2po + 3pn +
qn
Mn(t)
)
(M−mtot) . (A58)
Given the initial condition mtot(ts) =M− (M−m−M)(3pn+qn)e
−2pots
qn+λ
, the solution to (A58) becomes
mtot(t) =M− (M−m−M)(3pn + qn)e
−2pot
qn +λe(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
. (A59)
Using, m−(t) =mo1(t)−mo2(t) and plugging in qo = 0 into equation (A57), we get
dm−(t)
dt
=
(
−2poc− 3pn− qnMn(t)
)
m−(t), (A60)
with the initial condition m−(ts) =
(M−m)(qn+2pn)e−2pocts
qn+αe
(qn+2pn)(ts−tf ) . The solution to (A60) with this initial
condition is given by
m−(t) =
(M −m) (qn + 3pn)e−2poct
qn +λe(qn+3pn)(t−ts)
.
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Given that mo1(t) +m
o
2(t) =m
tot(t)−n(t), we get the final expressions for mo1(t) and mo2(t).
Proof of Proposition 5
Plugging in the conditions of Proposition 5 into (31)-(35), and using (??) we have:
do1
dt
= −3pno1−Qn(n1 +n2)o1− qnn3o1, (A61)
do2
dt
= −3pno2−Qn(n1 +n2)o2− qnn3o2, (A62)
dn1
dt
= pn(o1 + o2) +Qnn1(o1 + o2), (A63)
dn2
dt
= pn(o1 + o2) +Qnn2(o1 + o2), (A64)
dn3
dt
= pn(o1 + o2) + qnn3(o1 + o2), (A65)
with the initial conditions:
o1(ts) = θ (1−n3(ts)−S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))) , (A66)
o2(ts) = (1− θ) (1−n3(ts)−S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))) , (A67)
n1(ts) = 0, (A68)
n2(t) = S (n3(ts), n3(tf )) , (A69)
ts− tf =
n3(ts)∫
n3(tf )
dy
(pn + qny) (1− y−S(y,n3(tf ))) . (A70)
Combining (A63) and (A64), we get
dn1
pn +Qnn1
=
dn2
pn +Qnn2
, (A71)
or
n1(t) =
pn
Qn
((
pn +Qnn2(t)
pn +Qnn2(ts)
)
− 1
)
. (A72)
Similarly, putting together (A63) and (A70) yields
n1(t) =
pn
Qn
((
pn + qnn3(t)
pn + qnn(ts)
)Qn
qn
− 1
)
. (A73)
Denoting
S2(x) =
pn
Qn
((
pn + qnx
pn + qnn3(ts)
)Qn
qn
− 1
)
(A74)
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and using o1(t) + o2(t) +n1(t) +n2(t) +n3(t) = 1, we convert (A70) into
dn3
dt
= (pn + qnn3)
(
1−n2(ts)−S2(n3)
(
2 +
Qn
pn
n2(ts)
)
−n3
)
, (A75)
so that
t− ts =
n3(t)∫
n3(ts)
dy
(pn + qny)
(
1−n2(ts)− y−S2(y)
(
2 + Qn
pn
n2(ts)
)) . (A76)
Further, combining (A61) and (A63), we get
do1
o1
=
do2
o2
, (A77)
and
o2(t) =
o2(ts)
o1(ts)
o1(t). (A78)
Finally, from o1(t) + o2(t) +n1(t) +n2(t) +n3(t) = 1 we obtain
o1(t) =
(
o1(ts)
o1(ts) + o2(ts)
)(
1−n3(t)−S2 (n3(t))
(
2 +
Qnn2(ts)
pn
)
−n2(ts)
)
, (A79)
and
o2(t) =
(
o2(ts)
o1(ts) + o2(ts)
)(
1−n3(t)−S2 (n3(t))
(
2 +
Qnn2(ts)
pn
)
−n2(ts)
)
. (A80)
Proof of Corollary 5.1
For qn =Qn, (28) becomes S2(x) = pn
(
x−n3(ts)
pn+qnn3(ts)
)
, and
t− ts =
n3(t)∫
n3(ts)
dy
(pn + qny)
(
1−n2(ts)− y−S2(y)
(
2 + qn
pn
n2(ts)
))
=
n3(t)∫
n3(ts)
dy(
pn
qn
+ y
)(
(1−n2(ts))pn+n3(ts)(2pn+qn)
3pn+qn(n3(ts)+n2(ts))
− y
)
=
(
1
qn + 3pn
)
log
(
(1−n2(ts)−n3(ts)) (pn + qnn3(t))
(1−n2(ts)−n3(ts)) (pn + qnn3(t)) + (n3(ts)−n3(t)) (qn + 3pn)
)
. (A81)
The last expression is equivalent to
n3(t) =
n3(ts) (qn + 3pn) + pn (1− exp (− (qn + 3pn) (t− ts))) (1−n2(ts)−n3(ts))
(qn + 3pn)− qn (1− exp (− (qn + 3pn) (t− ts))) (1−n2(ts)−n3(ts)) . (A82)
Finally, substituting (A82) into (47), we get (48).
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Proof of Proposition 6
a) Using the expression for n(t) =mn1(t)+ m
n
2(t)+m
n
3(t) from (43), and taking the limit we have:
lim
t→∞
n(t) = lim
t→∞
M
(
1− 3pn + qn
λe(3pn+qn)(t−ts) + qn
)
=M, (A83)
Then, using â(t) =mn3(t)−mn2(t) and taking the limit we get
lim
t→∞
â(t) =
a(ts)e
(3(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−ts)(λ+ qn)
λe(3pn+qn)(t−ts) + qn
= lim
t→∞
a(ts)(λ+ qn)
λe3pnc(t−ts) + qne−(3(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−ts)
= 0. (A84)
For b̂(t) =mn2(t)−mn1(t) the limit gets us
lim
t→∞
b̂(t) = lim
t→∞
mn2(ts)e
(3(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−ts)(λ+ qn)
λe(3pn+qn)(t−ts) + qn
= lim
t→∞
mn2(ts)(λ+ qn)
λe3pnc(t−ts) + qne−(3(pn−pnc)+qn)(t−ts)
= 0. (A85)
Combining equations (A83)-(A85) yields m∞1 =m
∞
2 =m
∞
3 =
M
3
.
b) Note that in Corollary 3.2, o1 (∞) = o2 (∞) = 0. Then, as it follows from (47),
1−n∞3 −S (n∞3 , n3(ts))
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(ts), n3(tf ))
)
−S (n3(ts), n3(tf )) = 0. (A86)
Introducing γ = pn
Qn
and δ= Qn
qn
, we can transform (A86) into
n∞3 = 1−
γ
δ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ
− 1
)(
1 +
(
γ+n3(ts)
γ+n3(tf )
)δ)
− γ
δ
((
γ+n(ts)
γ+n3(tf )
)δ
− 1
)
, (A87)
which, in turn, is equivalent to (51). Further, (52) are obtained by substituting (A87) into the last
2 equations in (47). For Qn = qn (51) becomes
1− γ (n3(ts)−n3(tf ))
γ+n3(tf )
−n∞3 = γ
(
2 +
n3(ts)−n3(tf )
γ+n3(tf )
)(
n∞3 −n3(ts)
γ+n3(ts)
)
, (A88)
or, equivalently,
n∞3 =
(γ+n3(tf )− γn3(ts) + γn3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts)) + γ (2γ+n3(ts) +n3(tf ))n3(ts)
(γ+n3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts)) + γ (2γ+n3(ts) +n3(tf ))
=
(3γ+ 1)(γ+n3(tf ))) (γ+n3(ts))
(γ+n3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts)) + γ (2γ+n3(ts) +n3(tf ))
− γ. (A89)
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Then, using (52), one gets
n∞1 =
γ
γ+n3(ts)
(n∞3 −n3(ts)) =
γ(3γ+ 1)(γ+n3(tf )))
(γ+n3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts)) + γ (2γ+n3(ts) +n3(tf ))
− γ, (A90)
and
n∞2 =
γ(3γ+ 1)(γ+n3(ts)))
(γ+n3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts)) + γ (2γ+n3(ts) +n3(tf ))
− γ. (A91)
Differentiating (51) with respect to n3(ts), we get
∂n∞3
∂n3(ts)
=
γ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ)(
1
γ+n3(ts)
)
1 + γ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(tf )
)δ−1 (
1
γ+n3(tf )
)
+
(
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ−1 (
1
γ+n3(ts)
)) > 0. (A92)
Monotonicity of n∞3 with respect to n3(tf ) is shown in exactly same way. Further, using (52), we
get
∂n∞1
∂n3(ts)
= γ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ−1(
1
γ+n3(ts)
)(
∂n∞3
∂n3(ts)
− γ+n
∞
3
γ+n3(ts)
))
. (A93)
Now,
∂n∞3
∂n3(ts)
− γ+n
∞
3
γ+n3(ts)
=
γ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ)(
1
γ+n3(ts)
)
1 + γ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(tf )
)δ−1 (
1
γ+n3(tf )
)
+
(
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ−1 (
1
γ+n3(ts)
)) − γ+n∞3γ+n3(ts)
=
− (γ+n∞3 )− γ
(
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(tf )
)δ
(
1 + γ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(tf )
)δ−1 (
1
γ+n3(tf )
)
+
(
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ−1 (
1
γ+n3(ts)
)))
(γ+n3(ts))
< 0, (A94)
so that
∂n∞1
∂n3(ts)
< 0. On the other hand,
∂n∞1
∂n3(tf )
= γ
((
γ+n∞3
γ+n3(ts)
)δ−1(
1
γ+n3(ts)
))
∂n∞3
∂n3(tf )
> 0. (A95)
Similarly, since n∞1 turns into n
∞
2 upon exchange of n3(tf ) and n3(ts),
∂n∞2
∂n3(ts)
> 0 and
∂n∞2
∂n3(tf )
< 0.
Now, consider a symmetric imitation setting, δ= 1. Noting that since n∞3 can be re-expressed as
(3γ+ 1)(γ+n3(tf ))) (γ+n3(ts))
(γ+n3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts)) + γ (2γ+n3(ts) +n3(tf ))
− γ = 3γ+ 1
1 + γ
γ+n3(tf )
+ γ
γ+n3(ts)
− γ, (A96)
Pac¸, Savin, and Velu: When to Adopt a Service Innovation: Nash Equilibria in a Competitive Diffusion Framework
14 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
it is a monotone increasing function of both n3(tf ) and n3(ts). On the other hand, for fixed values
of n3(tf ) and n3(ts),
∂n∞3
∂γ
=
3
(
3− n3(tf )
γ+n3(tf )
− n3(ts)
γ+n3(ts)
)
− (3γ+ 1)
(
n3(tf )
(γ+n3(tf ))
2 +
n3(ts)
(γ+n3(ts))2
)
(
3− n3(tf )
γ+n3(tf )
− n3(ts)
γ+n3(ts)
)2 − 1. (A97)
This expression is negative if and only if
(
n3(tf )
γ+n3(tf )
+
n3(ts)
γ+n3(ts)
)(
3− n3(tf )
γ+n3(tf )
− n3(ts)
γ+n3(ts)
)
< (3γ+ 1)
(
n3(tf )
(γ+n3(tf ))2
+
n3(ts)
(γ+n3(ts))2
)
(A98)
which is equivalent to
2 <
(
(2γ+ 1)
γ+n3(tf )
+
(2γ+ 1)
γ+n3(ts)
)
+
2γ2
(γ+n3(tf )) (γ+n3(ts))
−
(
(2γ+ 1)γ
(γ+n3(tf ))2
+
(2γ+ 1)γ
(γ+n3(ts))2
)
. (A99)
Note that for a given value of n3(tf ), the market share value n3(ts) is greater or equal to n3(tf )
but, as follows from (29) and (49), it cannot exceed n̂3 =
γ+(1+γ)n3(tf )
2γ+n3(tf )
. In other words, the value of
zs =
1
γ+n3(ts)
belongs to the interval
[
1
2γ+1
(
1 + γ
γ+n3(tf )
)
, 1
γ+n3(tf )
]
. Then, for given value of n3(tf ),
we only need to check validity of (A99) at the boundary points of this interval. In particular, for
zs =
1
2γ+1
(
1 + γ
γ+n3(tf )
)
, (A99) is equivalent to
3γ+ 1
2γ+ 1
<
(2γ+ 1) (γ+ 1)
γ+n3(tf )
+
γ2 + (1 + 2γ3) (1 + 2γ)
2
(1 + 2γ)
2
(γ+n3(tf ))
2 (A100)
which is trivially satisfied for n3(tf ) = 1, and, therefore, for any n3(tf ) ∈ (0,1). Further, for zs =
1
γ+n3(tf )
, (A99) is equivalent to
1<
2γ+ 1
γ+n3(tf )
− γ (γ+ 1)
(γ+n3(tf ))2
, (A101)
which, in turn, is trivially satisfied for any n3(tf )∈ (0,1).
Proof of Proposition 7
Adding (54) and (55), we have a Bass-like equation for mo(t) =mo1(t) +m
o
2(t) for t≥ TF :
dmo
dt
=
(
2po +
qo
Mm
o
)
(M−mo) , (A102)
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with the initial condition
mo (TF ) =m
o
1 (TF ) +m
o
1 (TF ) . (A103)
Defining, for t¯= t−TF ,
m¯o (t¯) =mo (t)−mo (TF ) , (A104)
we note that (A102)-(A103) is equivalent to
dmo
dt¯
=
(
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF ) +
qo
Mm¯
o
)
(M−mo (TF )− m¯o) , (A105)
with the initial condition
m¯o (t¯= 0) = 0. (A106)
Solution to (A105)-(A106) is given by
m¯o (t¯) = (M−mo (TF ))
1−
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
+ 1
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mm
o(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))t¯
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))t¯
 , (A107)
resulting in
mo (t) =mo (TF )+(M−mo (TF ))
1−
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
+ 1
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mm
o(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))(t−TF )
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))(t−TF )
 ,
(A108)
for t≥ TF . Then, (54) is equivalent to
dmo1
dt
=B(t) +mo1(t)A(t), (A109)
where
B(t) = po (M−mo(t)) + pocmo(t), (A110)
A(t) =
qo
M (M−m
o(t))− 2poc, (A111)
and mo(t) is given by (A108). Solution to (A109) for t≥ Tf with the initial condition mo1 (TF ) is
given by
mo1(t) = e
∫ t
TF
A(τ)dτ
(
mo1 (TF ) +
∫ t
TF
B(u)due
−∫ uTF A(v)dv
)
. (A112)
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Consider
∫ t
TF
A (τ)dτ
=
qo
M (M−m
o (TF ))
∫ t
TF
dτ

( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
+ 1
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mm
o(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))(τ−TF )
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))(τ−TF )

− 2poc (t−TF ) . (A113)
Note that
∫ t
TF
dτ

( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
+ 1
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mm
o(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))(τ−TF )
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))(τ−TF )

=
(
1
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF ) +
qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
)
× ln
 1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))(t−TF )
 , (A114)
so that
e
∫ t
TF
A(τ)dτ
= e−(2poc(t−TF ))
×
 1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )+
qo
M (M−mo(TF )))(t−TF )

1
2po+
qoMmo(TF )+
qoM (M−mo(TF ))
= e−2poc(t−TF )
 1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)(t−TF )

1
2po+qo
. (A115)
Next,
∫ t
TF
B(u)due
−∫ uTF A(v)dv =
∫ t
TF
B(u)du
(
e2poc(u−TF )
)1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)(u−TF )
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)

1
2po+qo
=
∫ t
TF
du
(
e2poc(u−TF )
)1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)(u−TF )
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)

1
2po+qo
(poM+ (poc− po)mo(u))
=
 1
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
 12po+qo I¯(t), (A116)
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where
I¯(t) =
∫ t−TF
0
due2pocu
(
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)u
) 1
2po+qo
(poM+ (poc− po)mo(u+TF ))
=
∫ t−TF
0
due2pocu
(
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)u
) 1
2po+qo
×
poM+ (poc− po)
mo (TF ) +
 M−mo (TF )
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)u

= (poM+ (poc− po)mo (TF )) I¯1(t) + (poc− po) (M−mo (TF )) I¯2(t), (A117)
with
I¯1(t) =
∫ t−TF
0
due2pocu
(
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)u
) 1
2po+qo
=
1
2poc
∫ e2poc(t−TF )
1
dx
(
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)
x−(
2po+qo
2poc )
) 1
2po+qo
=
1
2poc
(
e2poc(t−TF ) 2F1
(
2poc
2po + qo
,− 1
2po + qo
; 1 +
2poc
2po + qo
;
(
−
qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)(
e−(2po+qo)(t−TF )
))
−2F1
(
2poc
2po + qo
,− 1
2po + qo
; 1 +
2poc
2po + qo
;
(
−
qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)))
, (A118)
and
I¯2(t) =
∫ t−TF
0
due2pocu
(
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)u
) 1
2po+qo
−1
=
1
2poc
(
e2poc(t−TF ) 2F1
(
2poc
2po + qo
,1− 1
2po + qo
; 1 +
2poc
2po + qo
;
(
−
qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)(
e−(2po+qo)(t−TF )
))
−2F1
(
2poc
2po + qo
,1− 1
2po + qo
; 1 +
2poc
2po + qo
;
(
−
qo
M (M−mo (TF ))
2po +
qo
Mm
o (TF )
)))
. (A119)
Thus, (A112) is equivalent to
mo1(t) = e
∫ t
TF
A(τ)dτ
(
mo1 (TF ) +
∫ t
TF
B(u)due
−∫ uTF A(v)dv
)
= e−2poc(t−TF )
 1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)(t−TF )

1
2po+qo
× (mo1 (TF )
+
 1
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
 12po+qo ((poM+ (poc− po)mo (TF )) I¯1(t) + (poc− po) (M−mo (TF )) I¯2(t))
 .
(A120)
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Using the same approach, we obtain
mo2(t) = e
∫ t
TF
A(τ)dτ
(
mo2 (TF ) +
∫ t
TF
B(u)due
−∫ uTF A(v)dv
)
= e−2poc(t−TF )
 1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
e−(2po+qo)(t−TF )

1
2po+qo
× (mo2 (TF )
+
 1
1 +
( qo
M (M−mo(TF ))
2po+
qo
Mmo(TF )
)
 12po+qo ((poM+ (poc− po)mo (TF )) I¯1(t) + (poc− po) (M−mo (TF )) I¯2(t))
 .
(A121)
Proof of Proposition 8
a) Consider a setting where the innovation succeeds. In this setting, the terminal customer base
values can be obtained by equating the right-hand sides in (59)-(63) to 0, in the limit of t→∞. In
particular, adding the right-hand sides of (61)-(63), we get
n∞1 +n
∞
2 +n
∞
3 = 1. (A122)
Then, the right-hand sides of (61) and (62) imply that
p12ncn
∞
2 + p
13
ncn
∞
3 −
(
p21nc + p
31
nc
)
n∞1 = 0, (A123)
p21ncn
∞
1 + p
23
ncn
∞
3 −
(
p12nc + p
32
nc
)
n∞2 = 0. (A124)
Combining (A123)-(A124) with (A122), we obtain
P

n∞1
n∞2
n∞3
=

1
0
0
 , (A125)
where
P =

1 1 1
− (p21nc + p31nc) p12nc p13nc
p21nc − (p12nc + p32nc) p23nc
 . (A126)
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Then, 
n∞1
n∞2
n∞3
= P−1

1
0
0
 . (A127)
Note that
P−1 =
1
det (P)

p12ncp
23
nc + p
13
nc (p
12
nc + p
32
nc) − (p12nc + p32nc + p23nc) p13nc− p12nc
(p21nc + p
31
nc)p
23
nc + p
13
ncp
21
nc p
23
nc− p21nc − (p13nc + p21nc + p31nc)
(p21nc + p
31
nc) (p
12
nc + p
32
nc)− p21ncp12nc (p12nc + p32nc + +p21nc) (p12nc + p21nc + p31nc)
 , (A128)
where
det (P) = p12ncp
23
nc + p
21
ncp
13
nc +
(
p21nc + p
31
nc
) (
p12nc + p
32
nc
)− p12ncp21nc + p23nc (p21nc + p31nc)+ p13nc (p12nc + p32nc)
= p12ncp
23
nc + p
21
ncp
13
nc + p
32
ncp
21
nc + p
31
nc
(
p12nc + p
32
nc
)
+ p23nc
(
p21nc + p
31
nc
)
+ p13nc
(
p12nc + p
32
nc
)
= p12ncp
23
nc + p
21
ncp
13
nc + p
31
ncp
12
nc + p
23
ncp
31
nc + p
13
ncp
32
nc + p
32
ncp
21
nc + p
12
ncp
13
nc + p
21
ncp
23
nc + p
31
ncp
32
nc. (A129)
Thus,
n∞1
n∞2
n∞3
=
1
det (P)

p12ncp
23
nc + p
13
nc (p
12
nc + p
32
nc)
(p21nc + p
31
nc)p
23
nc + p
13
ncp
21
nc
(p21nc + p
31
nc) (p
12
nc + p
32
nc)− p21ncp12nc
=
1
det (P)

p12ncp
23
nc + p
13
ncp
32
nc + p
12
ncp
13
nc
p21ncp
13
nc + p
23
ncp
31
nc + p
21
ncp
23
nc
p32ncp
21
nc + p
31
ncp
12
nc + p
31
ncp
32
nc
 ,
(A130)
which is equivalent to (64)-(66).
Now, using the limit of t→∞ for the right-hand sides of (59)-(60), and noting (A122), we get
− (po + qoo∞1 ) (o∞1 + o∞2 ) + p12oco∞2 −
(
p21oc + 3pn +Qn (n
∞
1 +n
∞
2 ) + qnn
∞
3
)
o∞1 = 0,
− (po + qoo∞2 ) (o∞1 + o∞2 ) + p21oco∞1 −
(
p12oc + 3pn +Qn (n
∞
1 +n
∞
2 ) + qnn
∞
3
)
o∞2 = 0. (A131)
Adding the two equations in (A131), we get
− (2po + qo (o∞1 + o∞2 )) (o∞1 + o∞2 )− (3pn +Qn (n∞1 +n∞2 ) + qnn∞3 ) (o∞1 + o∞2 ) = 0, (A132)
that results in o∞1 = o
∞
2 = 0.
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b) In the setting where the innovation fails at t= TF , for any t > TF the customer base dynamics
is described by the modified version of (54)-(55):
dmo1
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
1
)
(M−mo1−mo2) + p12ocmo2− p21ocmo1, (A133)
dmo2
dt
=
(
po +
qo
Mm
o
2
)
(M−mo1−mo2) + p21ocmo1− p12ocmo2. (A134)
In the limit of t→∞, these result in
(po + qoo
∞
1 ) (1− o∞1 − o∞2 ) + p12oco∞2 − p21oco∞1 = 0,
(po + qoo
∞
2 ) (1− o∞1 − o∞2 ) + p21oco∞1 − p12oco∞2 = 0. (A135)
Adding the two equations in (A135), we get
1− o∞1 − o∞2 = 0, (A136)
so that the solution to (A135) is given by the combination of
p12oco
∞
2 − p21oco∞1 = 0, (A137)
and (A136). Then, (67)-(68) follow.
Proof of Proposition 9
We will prove the quasiconcavity of the firm’s 1 profit function by showing that this function
cannot have unconstrained local minima. Define Tc as a set of local unconstrained optima of
Π1 (t1, t2):
Tc =
(
0< t< tmax|∂Π1 (t1, t2)
∂t1
|t1=t = 0
)
. (A138)
The statement of the Proposition will be established if we show that
∂2Π1 (t1, t2)
∂ (t1)
2 |t1=t∗ ≤ 0 (A139)
for any t∗ ∈ Tc. Consider the case where t∗ ≥ t2 (the proof for the case of t∗ ≤ t2 follows similar
steps). Then,
∂Π1 (t1, t2)
∂t1
|t1=t∗ = 0⇔ ρ
 +∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
+
 +∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂n1(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
= 0,
(A140)
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where ρ= θpio
pin
and
+∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂n1(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt= e−βt
∗ dn3(t
∗)
dt∗
pn
pn + qnn3(t∗)
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
Qn
pn
S (n3(t), n3(t
∗)) + 1
)
×
n3(t∗)−n3(t)−S (n3(t), n3(t∗))
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n3(t
∗), n3(t2))
)
1−S (n3(t∗), n3(t2))−n3(t∗)
du, (A141)
and
+∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt= e−βt
∗
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
∂o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂u
)
du
= e−βt
∗ dn3(t
∗)
dt∗
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
∂o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂n3(t∗)
+
∂o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂n3(t)
∂n3(t)
∂n3(t∗)
)
du
= −
+∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂n1(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dte−βt
∗ − dn3(t
∗)
dt∗
pn
pn + qnn3(t∗)
1
1−S (n3(t∗), n3(t2))−n3(t∗)
×
+∞∫
0
e−βu
[
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t), n3(t2)) +
pn + qnn3(t)
pn
]
×
(
1−S (n3(t∗), n3(t2))−n3(t)−S (n3(t), n3(t∗))
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t
∗), n3(t2))
))
du. (A142)
The sign of the second derivative of the profit function at a local optimum depends on whether
the ratio
R=
+∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂o13(t,t
∗,t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
+∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂n1(t,t∗,t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
(A143)
is an increasing or a decreasing function of t∗. Using a shorthand notation n3 = n3(t), n∗3 = n3 (t
∗),
n23 = n3 (t2), we get
R=−1−
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
1 + Qn
pn
S (n3, n
2
3) +
pn+qnn3
pn
)(
1−S (n∗3, n23)−n3−S (n3, n∗3)
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
))
du
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
Qn
pn
S (n3, n∗3) + 1
)(
n∗3−n3−S (n3, n∗3)
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
))
du
,
(A144)
so that now we need to check the monotonicity of
R̂ =
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
1 + Qn
pn
S (n3, n
2
3) +
pn+qnn3
pn
)(
1−S (n∗3, n23)−n3−S (n3, n∗3)
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
))
du
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
Qn
pn
S (n3, n∗3) + 1
)(
n∗3−n3−S (n3, n∗3)
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
))
du
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=
(
1 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
)
1
pn
+∞∫
0
e−βudS (n3, n∗3) +
1
pn
(
β
+∞∫
0
e−βun3du−n∗3
)
−(1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3)
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
Qn
pn
S (n3, n∗3) + 1
)
du+ 1
pn
+∞∫
0
e−βudS (n3, n∗3)
=
(
1 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
)
β
pn
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du+
1
pn
(
β
+∞∫
0
e−βun3du−n∗3
)
−(1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3)
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
Qn
pn
S (n3, n∗3) + 1
)
du+ β
pn
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
=
(pn+qnn∗3)
Qn
qn
(pn+qnn23)
Qn
qn
+
+∞∫
0
e−βu(n3−n∗3)du
+∞∫
0
e−βuS(n3,n∗3)du
1 + (n∗3 +S (n
∗
3, n
2
3)− 1)
Qn
β
+ pn
β2
+∞∫
0
e−βuS(n3,n∗3)du
 =
1
(pn+qnn23)
Qn
qn
+ qn
pn
A (n∗3)
B (n∗3)
(A145)
with
A (n∗3) =
δ
+∞∫
0
e−βu(n3−n∗3)du
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(pn + qnn3)
δ − (pn + qnn∗3)δ
)
du
,
B (n∗3) =
1 + (n∗3 +S (n
∗
3, n
2
3)− 1)
Qn
β
+ pn
β2
+∞∫
0
e−βuS(n3,n∗3)du

(pn + qnn∗3)δ
, (A146)
where we have used δ= Qn
qn
≥ 1.
Below we will show that under the assumptions of the proposition A is a non-increasing, and B
is a non-decreasing function of n∗3. For convenience, we state these results as Lemmata.
Lemma A1
For β ≤ 3pn, A is a non-increasing function of n∗3.
Proof
First,
A (n∗3) =
δ
+∞∫
0
e−βu(n3−n∗3)du
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(pn + qnn3)
δ − (pn + qnn∗3)δ
)
du
=
1
q
δ
+∞∫
0
e−βu((pn + qnn3)− (pn + qnn∗3)du
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(pn + qnn3)
δ − (pn + qnn∗3)δ
)
du
=
1
qnpδ−1n
δ
+∞∫
0
e−βu((1 + y)− (1 + y∗)du
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(1 + y)
δ − (1 + y∗)δ
)
du
, (A147)
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where y= qnn3
pn
and y∗ = qnn
∗
3
pn
. Note that the monotonicity of A with respect to n∗3 is equivalent to
the monotonicity of
D=
δ
+∞∫
0
e−βu((1 + y)− (1 + y∗)du
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(1 + y)
δ − (1 + y∗)δ
)
du
(A148)
with respect to y∗. Further, the sign of dA
dy∗ is the same as
δ
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
dy
dy∗
− 1
)
du
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(1 + y)
δ − (1 + y∗)δ
)
du

−δ
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(1 + y)
δ−1 dy
dy∗
− (1 + y∗)δ−1
)
du
 +∞∫
0
e−βu (y− y∗)du

≤ δ
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
dy
dy∗
− 1
)
du
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(1 + y)
δ − (1 + y∗)δ
)
du

−δ (1 + y∗)δ−1
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
dy
dy∗
− 1
)
du
 +∞∫
0
e−βu (y− y∗)du

= δ
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
dy
dy∗
− 1
)
du

×
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(1 + y)
δ − (1 + y∗)δ
)
du− (1 + y∗)δ−1
+∞∫
0
e−βu (y− y∗)du
 . (A149)
Note that  +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
(1 + y)
δ − (1 + y∗)δ
)
du− (1 + y∗)δ−1
+∞∫
0
e−βu (y− y∗)du

= (1 + y∗)δ
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
((
1 + y
1 + y∗
)δ
−
(
1 + y
1 + y∗
))
du

= (1 + y∗)δ
 +∞∫
0
e−βu
(
1 + y
1 + y∗
)((
1 + y
1 + y∗
)δ−1
− 1
)
du
≥ 0 (A150)
for y≥ y∗and δ≥ 1. Since dy
dy∗ =
dn3
dn∗3
and
dn3
dn∗3
− 1 =
(pn + qnn3)
(
1−S (n∗3, n23)−n3−S (n3, n∗3)
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
))
(pn + qnn∗3) (1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3)
, (A151)
so that
+∞∫
0
due−βu
(
dy
dy∗
− 1
)
=
+∞∫
0
due−βu
(
dn3
du
− (pn + qnn∗3) (1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3)
(pn + qnn∗3) (1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3)
)
. (A152)
Pac¸, Savin, and Velu: When to Adopt a Service Innovation: Nash Equilibria in a Competitive Diffusion Framework
24 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
Now,
+∞∫
0
due−βu
(
dn3
du
− (pn + qnn∗3)
(
1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3))
= −n∗3 +β
+∞∫
0
n3due
−βu− 1
β
(pn + qnn
∗
3)
(
1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3)
≤ n∗3−n∗3−
1
β
(pn + qnn
∗
3)
(
1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3) . (A153)
where n∗3 = limu→+∞ (n3) is the limiting customer base indicator of the new entrant firm, for given
values of n23 and n
∗
3. According to (47), n
∗
3 is the solution to the following equation
1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3−S (n∗3, n∗3)(2 + Qnpn S (n∗3, n23)
)
= 0. (A154)
Note that the left hand-side of (A153) is non-positive for any β ≤ β∗, where
β∗ = inf
n23,,n
∗
3≥n23
(
(pn + qnn
∗
3) (1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3)
n∗3−n∗3
)
= inf
n23,,n
∗
3≥n23
pn + qnn∗3 + (pn + qnn∗3) S (n∗3, n∗3)
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
)
n∗3−n∗3
 . (A155)
Now, consider the expression
G = (pn + qnn
∗
3)
S (n∗3, n
∗
3)
n∗3−n∗3
=
qn (pn + qnn
∗
3)
(pn + qnn
∗
3)− (pn + qnn∗3)
(
pn
Qn
((
pn + qnn
∗
3
pn + qnn∗3
)δ
− 1
))
=
pn
δ
(
pn+qnn
∗
3
pn+qnn∗3
)δ
− 1(
pn+qnn∗3
pn+qnn∗3
)
− 1
=
pn
δ
(
(1 +F )
δ − 1
F
)
, (A156)
where
F =
(
pn + qnn
∗
3
pn + qnn∗3
)
− 1≥ 0. (A157)
Note that
dG
dn∗3
=
pn
δ
δ (1 +F )δ−1F −
(
(1 +F )
δ − 1
)
F 2
 dF
dn∗3
=
pn
δ
(
1 + (δ− 1) (1 +F )δ−1F − (1 +F )δ−1
F 2
)
dF
dn∗3
=
pn
δ
(1 +F )δ−1
(
1
(1+F )δ−1 + (δ− 1)F − 1
)
F 2
 dF
dn∗3
. (A158)
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Since 1
(1+F )δ−1 + (δ− 1)F − 1 is an increasing function of F for F ≥ 0, the smallest value for this
expression is 0 (reached at F = 0). Thus, the sign of dG
dn∗3
is the same as the sign of dF
dn∗3
. Now,
dF
dn∗3
=
q
dn∗3
dn∗3
(pn + qnn
∗
3)− qn(pn + qnn∗3)
(pn + qnn∗3)2
=
qn (pn + qnn
∗
3)
(pn + qnn∗3)
2
(
(pn + qnn
∗
3)dn
∗
3
(pn + qnn
∗
3)dn
∗
3
− 1
)
. (A159)
Using (A154), we get
0 = − pn
pn + qnn∗3
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S
(
n∗3, n
2
3
))− dn∗3
dn∗3
−
(
pn
pn + qnn
∗
3
dn∗3
dn∗3
− pn
pn + qnn∗3
)(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
∗
3)
)(
2 +
Qn
pn
S
(
n∗3, n
2
3
))
−Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
∗
3)
pn
pn + qnn∗3
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S
(
n∗3, n
2
3
))
, (A160)
or
(pn + qnn
∗
3)dn
∗
3
(pn + qnn
∗
3)dn
∗
3
− 1 =
− (pn + qnn∗3)− pn
(
1 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
∗
3)
)(
1 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
)
pn + qnn
∗
3 + pn
(
1 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
∗
3)
)(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
) ≤ 0, (A161)
so that dG
dn∗3
≤ 0. Then,
β∗ = inf
n23,n
∗
3≥n23
(
pn + qnn
∗
3 +G
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S
(
n∗3, n
2
3
)))
≥ inf
n23,n
∗
3≥n23
(pn + qnn
∗
3) + inf
n23,,n
∗
3≥n23
(
G
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S
(
n∗3, n
2
3
)))
≥ pn + pn inf
n23,n
∗
3≥n23
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S
(
n∗3, n
2
3
))
= 3pn, (A162)
where we have used monotonicity of G and S functions. Thus, any β ≤ 3pn also satisfies β ≤ β∗.
Thus, A is a non-increasing function of n∗3 for β ≤ 3pn. 
Lemma A2
For β ≤ 3pn, B is a non-decreasing function of n∗3.
Proof
From (A146),
B (n∗3) =
1 + (n∗3 +S (n
∗
3, n
2
3)− 1)
Qn
β
+ pn
β2
+∞∫
0
e−βuS(n3,n∗3)du

(pn + qnn∗3)δ
=
1
(pn + qnn∗3)δ
+
Qn
β
(n∗3 +S (n
∗
3, n
2
3)− 1)
(pn + qnn∗3)δ
+
pn (n
∗
3 +S (n
∗
3, n
2
3)− 1)
β2(pn + qnn∗3)δ
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
. (A163)
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Now,
d
dn∗3
(
n∗3 +S (n
∗
3, n
2
3)− 1
(pn + qnn∗3)δ
)
=
d
dn∗3
(
n∗3− pnQn − 1
(pn + qnn∗3)δ
)
=
(pn + qnn
∗
3)
δ − δqn(pn + qnn∗3)δ−1
(
n∗3− pnQn − 1
)
(pn + qnn∗3)2δ
=
1
(pn + qnn∗3)δ+1
(qnn
∗
3 (1− δ) + 2pn + δq) , (A164)
and
d
dn∗3
 pn (n∗3 +S (n∗3, n23)− 1)
β2(pn + qnn∗3)δ
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
= pn
β2
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
d
dn∗3
(
n∗3 +S (n
∗
3, n
2
3)− 1
(pn + qnn∗3)δ
)
+
pn
β2
(
n∗3 +S (n
∗
3, n
2
3)− 1
(pn + qnn∗3)δ
)
d
dn∗3
 1+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
 . (A165)
Further,
d
dn∗3
 1+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
=−
d
dn∗3
(
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
)
(
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
)2
=
+∞∫
0
e−βu
((
pn
pn+qnn∗3
)
−
(
pn
pn+qnn3
)
dn3
dn∗3
)(
1 + Qn
pn
S (n3, n
∗
3)
)
du(
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
)2 . (A166)
As (47) indicates,
dn3(t)
dn3(t∗)
=
(pn + qnn3(t))
(
1−S (n3(t∗), n3(t2))−n3(t)−S (n3(t), n3(t∗))
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n3(t
∗), n3(t2))
))
(pn + qnn3(t∗)) (1−S (n3(t∗), n3(t2))−n3(t∗)) .
(A167)
Using (A167), we get
+∞∫
0
e−βu
((
pn
pn + qnn3
)
dn3
dn∗3
−
(
pn
pn + qnn∗3
))(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3, n
∗
3)
)
du
=
(
pn
pn + qnn∗3
)
×
+∞∫
0
e−βudu
n∗3−n3−S (n3, n∗3)
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n∗3, n
2
3)
)
(1−S (n∗3, n23)−n∗3)
(1 + Qn
pn
S (n3, n
∗
3)
)
, (A168)
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and
d
dn∗3
 1+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
 =
(
pn
pn + qnn∗3
)
×
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
n3(t)−n∗3+S(n3(t),n∗3)(2+Qnpn S(n
∗
3,n
2
3))
(1−S(n∗3,n23)−n∗3)
)(
1 + Qn
pn
S (n3, n
∗
3)
)
du(
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
)2
≥ 0. (A169)
Putting these results together, we get
dB (n∗3)
dn∗3
= − δqn
(pn + qnn∗3)
δ+1
+
Qnβ + pn
β2
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
 (qnn∗3 (1− δ) + 2pn + δqn)(pn + qnn∗3)δ+1
+
pn
β2
(
n∗3 +S (n
∗
3, n
2
3)− 1
(pn + qnn∗3)δ
)
d
dn∗3
 1+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du

≥ − δqn
(pn + qnn∗3)
δ+1
+
Qnβ + pn
β2
+∞∫
0
e−βuS (n3, n∗3)du
 (qn∗3 (1− δ) + 2pn + δqn)(pn + qnn∗3)δ+1
≥ − δqn
(pn + qnn∗3)
δ+1
+
(
Qn
β
+
pn
β
)
(qnn
∗
3 (1− δ) + 2pn + δqn)
(pn + qnn∗3)δ+1
≥ − Qn
(pn + qnn∗3)
δ+1
+
(
Qn
β
+
pn
β
)
(qn + 2pn)
(pn + qnn∗3)δ+1
≥ 0 (A170)
for any β ≤ (Qn+pn)(qn+2pn)
Qn
, in particular, for β ≤ 3pn. Note that in deriving (A170) we have used
(A169), as well as S (n3, n
∗
3)≤ 1 and n∗3 ≤ 1.

Thus, the second derivative of the profit function at any local optimum is non-positive - the
profit function is quasiconcave.
Proof of Proposition 10
Let ρ= pioθ
pin
and define Tm as a set of local unconstrained maxima of Π1 (t1, t2):
Tm =
(
0< t< tmax|∂Π1 (t1, t2)
∂t1
|t1=t = 0,
∂2Π1 (t1, t2)
∂(t1)2
|t1=t ≤ 0
)
. (A171)
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The statement of the Proposition will be established if we show that
∂t
∂ρ
≥ 0 (A172)
for any t∈ Tm. Consider an arbitrary t∗ ∈ Tm. Then,
∂Π1 (t1, t2)
∂t1
|t1=t∗ = 0, (A173)
and
∂2Π1 (t1, t2)
∂t1∂ρ
|t1=t∗ +
∂t∗
∂ρ
∂2Π1 (t1, t2)
∂(t1)2
|t1=t∗ = 0.
Consider t∗ ≥ t2 (the proof for the case of t∗ ≤ t2 follows similar steps). Then,
∂Π1 (t1, t2)
∂t1
|t1=t∗ = 0⇔ ρ
 +∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
+
 +∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂n1(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
= 0,
(A174)
and
∂2Π1 (t1, t2)
∂(t1)2
|t1=t∗ ≤ 0⇔ ρ
 +∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂2o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂(t∗)2
)
dt− e−βt∗
(
∂o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
|t=t∗
)
+
 +∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂2n1(t, t
∗, t2)
∂(t∗)2
)
dt− e−βt∗
(
∂n1(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
|t=t∗
)
≤ 0, (A175)
Differentiating (A174) with respect to ρ, we get +∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
+ ∂t∗
∂ρ
(
∂2Π1 (t1, t2)
∂(t1)2
|t1=t∗
)
= 0. (A176)
Note that, as (A174) indicates, +∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂o13(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
=−1
ρ
 +∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂n1(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
 . (A177)
Now, noting that n3(t) for t ≥ t∗ is actually a function of u = t − t∗ and a parameter n3(t∗),
n3(t) = f (u,n3(t
∗)), we can re-express the integral on the right-hand side of (A174) as
+∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂n1(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
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= e−βt
∗
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
∂n1
∂u
)
du
= e−βt
∗ dn3(t
∗)
dt∗
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
∂S (n3(t), n3(t
∗))
∂n3(t∗)
+
∂S (n3(t), n3(t
∗))
∂n3(t)
dn3(t)
dn3(t∗)
)
du, (A178)
where we have dropped the notation for a fixed value of t2. Note that the second term in brackets
in (A178) contains the limit of the ratio of the change of the function S at any point t to the change
in the function value n3(t). Strictly speaking, we need to use the variance notation
δS(n3(t),n3(t∗))
δn3(t)
here to denote such limit - however, we retain the “partial derivative” notation for simplicity. Using
(28), we get
∂S (n3(t), n3(t
∗))
∂n3(t∗)
=− pn
pn + qnn3(t∗)
(
Qn
pn
S (n3(t), n3(t
∗)) + 1
)
, (A179)
and
∂S (n3(t), n3(t
∗))
∂n3(t)
=
pn
pn + qnn3(t)
(
Qn
pn
S (n3(t), n3(t
∗)) + 1
)
. (A180)
Recall that from (A167),
dn3(t)
dn3(t∗)
=
(pn + qnn3(t))
(
1−S (n3(t∗), n3(t2))−n3(t)−S (n3(t), n3(t∗))
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n3(t
∗), n3(t2))
))
(pn + qnn3(t∗)) (1−S (n3(t∗), n3(t2))−n3(t∗)) .
(A181)
Substituting (A179)-(A181) into (A178), we get
+∞∫
t∗
e−βt
(
∂n1(t, t
∗, t2)
∂t∗
)
dt
= e−βt
∗ dn3(t
∗)
dt∗
pn
pn + qnn3(t∗)
+∞∫
0
e−βudu
(
Qn
pn
S (f(u,n3(t
∗)), n3(t
∗)) + 1
)
×
n3(t∗)− f(u,n3(t∗))−S (f(u,n3(t∗)), n3(t∗))
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n3(t
∗), n3(t2))
)
1−S (n3(t∗), n3(t2))−n3(t∗)
 . (A182)
Now, since ∂n3(t
∗)
∂t∗ > 0, 1 − S (n3(t∗), n3(t2)) − n3(t∗) > 0 (follows from (47)), and n3(t∗) −
f(u,n3(t
∗))− S (f(u,n3(t∗)), n3(t∗))
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n3(t
∗), n3(t2))
)
≤ 0 for any u ≥ 0 (equality is true
only at u = 0), integrals in (A182) are negative. Thus, the left-hand side of (A177) is positive.
Combining this result with (A175) and (A176), we establish that ∂t
∗
∂ρ
≥ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 11
a) Without loss of generality, consider the setting in which t1 ≥ t2. Then,
Π̂1 (t1, t2) =
Π1 (t1, t2)
pin
= ρΠo (t1, t2) + Πn (t1, t2) , (A183)
where ρ= θpio
pin
, and
Πo (t1, t2) =
t2∫
0
e−βto11(t)dt+
t1∫
t2
e−βto12(t)dt+
+∞∫
t1
e−βto13(t)dt,Πn (t1, t2) =
+∞∫
t1
e−βtS (n3(t), n3(t1))dt. (A184)
Similarly, for firm 2 we get, after some algebra,
Π̂2 (t1, t2) =
Π2 (t1, t2)
pin
= ρΠo (t1, t2) + Πn (t1, t2)
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
)
+
e−βt1
β
S (n3(t1), n3(t2)) +
t1∫
t2
e−βtS (n3(t), n3(t2))dt, (A185)
where ρ= (1−θ)pio
pin
.
Further, the first derivative of (A183) with respect to the adoption time t1 is
∂Π̂1
∂t1
= ρ
 +∞∫
t1
e−βt
∂o13(t)
∂t1
dt
+
 +∞∫
t1
e−βt
∂S (n3(t), n3(t1))
∂t1
dt

= (1− ρ)e−βt1 dn3(t1)
dt1
pn
pn + qnn3(t1)
+∞∫
0
due−βu
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t1))
)
×
n3 (t1)−n3(u)−S (n3(u), n3 (t1))
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
)
1−S (n3(t1), n3(t2))−n3 (t1)

−ρe−βt1 dn3(t1)
dt1
pn
pn + qnn3(t1)
×
+∞∫
0
due−βu
1−S (n3(t1), n3(t2))−n3(u)−S (n3(u), n3 (t1))
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2)
)
1−S (n3(t1), n3(t2))−n3 (t1)

×
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t1)) +
pn + qnn3(u)
pn
)
, (A186)
where we have used (A141) and (A142). Similarly, the first derivative of (A185) with respect to t2
is given by
∂Π̂2
∂t2
= ρ
∂Πo (t1, t2)
∂t2
+
∂Πn (t1, t2)
∂t2
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
)
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+
(
Πn (t1, t2)
Qn
pn
+
e−βt1
β
)(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
)
dn3 (t2)
dt2
×
(
pn
pn + qnn3(t1)
dn3(t1)
dn3(t2)
− pn
pn + qnn3(t2)
)
+
dn3 (t2)
dt2
t1∫
t2
e−βt
(
pn
pn + qnn3(t)
dn3(t)
dn3(t2)
− pn
pn + qnn3(t2)
)
×
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t), n3(t2))
)
dt. (A187)
Further,
∂Πo (t1, t2)
∂t2
=
t1∫
t2
e−βt
∂o12(t)
∂t2
dt+
+∞∫
t1
e−βt
∂o13(t)
∂t2
dt=
dn3 (t2)
dt2
t1∫
t2
dte−βt
×
(
− dn3(t)
dn3(t2)
−
(
pn
pn + qnn3(t)
dn3(t)
dn3(t2)
− pn
pn + qnn3(t2)
)(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t), n3(t2))
))
+
dn3 (t2)
dt2
+∞∫
t1
dte−βt
×
(
−1−
(
pn
pn + qnn3(t)
)(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t), n3(t2)
)(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
))
× dn3(t)
dn3(t1)
dn3(t1)
dn3(t2)
+
dn3 (t2)
dt2
+∞∫
t1
e−βt
(
pn
pn + qnn3(t1)
dn3(t1)
dn3(t2)
)
×
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
)(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t), n3(t1)
)
dt
−dn3 (t2)
dt2
+∞∫
t1
e−βt
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t), n3(t1))
)
×
(
pn
pn + qnn3(t1)
dn3(t1)
dn3(t2)
− pn
pn + qnn3(t2)
)(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
)
dt
= −dn3 (t2)
dt2
e−βt2
+∞∫
0
e−βu
dn3(u)
dn3(t2)
dt
+
dn3 (t2)
dt2
(
pn
pn + qnn3(t2)
)
e−βt2
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t2)
)
du
−dn3 (t2)
dt2
e−βt2
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
pn
pn + qnn3(u)
dn3(u)
dn3(t2)
)(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t2)
)
du
−dn3 (t2)
dt2
e−βt1
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
pn
pn + qnn3(u)
dn3(u)
dn3(t1)
dn3(t1)
dn3(t2)
)
×
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t2)
)(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
)
du
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+
dn3 (t2)
dt2
e−βt1
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
pn
pn + qnn3(t1)
dn3(t1)
dn3(t2)
)(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t1)
)
dt, (A188)
with
dn3(t1)
dn3(t2)
=
(pn + qnn3(t1))(1−n3(t1)−S (n3(t1), n3(t2)))
(pn + qnn3(t2))(1−n3(t2)) , (A189)
and
dn3(u)
dn3(t1)
=
(pn + qnn3(u))
(
1−n3(u)−S (n3(t1), n3(t2))−S (n3(u), n3(t1))
(
2 + Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
))
(pn + qnn3(t1))(1−n3(t1)−S (n3(t1), n3(t2))) ,
(A190)
for u≥ 0. Also,
∂Πn (t1, t2)
∂t2
=
dn3(t1)
dn3(t2)
dn3(t2)
dt2
e−βt1
+∞∫
0
e−βu
(
pn
pn + qnn3(u)
dn3(u)
dn3(t1)
− pn
pn + qnn3(t1)
)
×
(
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t1)) + 1
)
du. (A191)
We would like to establish conditions under which ∂Π̂1
∂t1
(t1, t2)≤ 0 for all t1 ≥ t2. Now, according to
(A186) the sign of ∂Π̂1
∂t1
is the same as the sign of
(1− ρ)
+∞∫
0
due−βu
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t1))
)
×
(
n3 (t1)−n3(u)−S (n3(u), n3 (t1))
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
))
−ρ
+∞∫
0
due−βu
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t1))
)
×
(
1−S (n3(t1), n3(t2))−n3(u)−S (n3(u), n3 (t1))
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2)
))
−β ρ
pn
+∞∫
0
due−βu (n3 (u)−n3(t1))
≤ (1− ρ)
+∞∫
0
due−βu
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), n3(t1))
)
×
(
n3 (t1)−n3(u)−S (n3(u), n3 (t1))
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(t1), n3(t2))
))
, (A192)
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which is non-positive for ρ≤ 1. In a similar fashion, ρ≤ 1 implies that ∂Π̂2
∂t2
(t1, t2)≤ 0 for all t2 ≥ t1.
The two conditions together imply that
∂Π̂1
∂t1
(0,0)≤ 0, ∂Π̂2
∂t2
(0,0)≤ 0, (A193)
so that the adoption Nash equilibrium is t∗1 = t
∗
2 = 0.
b) Now,
∂Π̂1
∂t1
=
dn3(t1)
dt1
pne
−βt1X (n3 (t1) , n3 (t2))
(pn + qnn3(t1)) (1−S (n3(t1), n3(t2))−n3 (t1)) , (A194)
where dn3(t1)
dt1
≥ 0, 1−S (n3(t1), n3(t2))−n3 (t1)> 0 and
X (a, b) = (1− ρ)
+∞∫
0
due−βu
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S(n3(u), a)
)(
a−n3(u)−S (n3(u), a)
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (a, b)
))
−ρ
+∞∫
0
due−βu
(
1 +
Qn
pn
S (n3(u), a) +
pn + qnn3(u)
pn
)
×
(
1−S (a, b)−n3(u)−S (n3(u), a)
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (a, b)
))
. (A195)
Further, in order to compute the limit of t1 = tmax and t2 = tmax, we set a= b and let a= 1−ε with
ε << 1. Then, starting at n3(0) = a, and noting that n3(u)− a is of the order of ε for all u≥ 0, we
get
S (n3(u), a) =
pn
Qn
((
pn + qnn3(u)
pn + qna
)Qn
qn
− 1
)
=
pnn3(u)
pn + qna
+ o (ε) , (A196)
where
n3(u) = n3(u)− a. (A197)
Denoting n̂3(u) =
n3(u)
pn+qn
, we have the evolution equation for n̂3(u) as
dn̂3
du
= (1 + n̂3) (ε− (3pn + qn)n̂3(u)) = ε− (3pn + qn)n̂3(u), (A198)
where we have only kept terms linear in ε. Then,
n̂3(u) =
ε
3pn + qn
(
1− e−(3pn+qn)u) , (A199)
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so that
n3(u) = a+
ε(pn + qn)
3pn + qn
(
1− e−(3pn+qn)u) , (A200)
and
S (n3(u), a) =
εp
3pn + qn
(
1− e−(3pn+qn)u) , (A201)
where, as before, we neglected terms of the order o (ε). Combining these results, we get
lim
a→1
X (a,a) =
[
(ρ− 1)qn + 3pn
β
− ρ
(
2 +
qn
pn
)]
ε
β+ 3pn + qn
≥ 0
iff β < pn(qn+3pn)
qn+2pn
and ρ≥ 1
1− β(2pn+qn)
pn(3pn+qn)
. In a similar way, ∂Π̂2
∂t2
is positive for high values of both t1 and
t2 iff β <
pn(qn+3pn)
qn+2pn
and ρ≥ 1
1−β(2pn+qn)
p(3pn+qn)
. Thus, both firms delay their adoption as much as possible
when both ρ and ρ exceed 1
1− β(2pn+qn)
pn(3pn+qn)
> 1, provided that, in addition, β < pn(qn+3pn)
qn+2pn
.
c) We would like to establish sufficient conditions guaranteeing that t∗1 = tmax, t
∗
2 = 0. As it follows
from (A194) and (A195), for the first incumbent we need to evaluate
lim
a→a∗
X (a,0)
1−S (a,0)− a, (A202)
where 1 − S (a∗,0) − a∗ = 0. Now, consider a such that 1 − S (a,0) − a = ε with ε << 1. Then,
similarly to (A200) and (A201), we get
n3(u) = a+
ε(pn + qna
∗)
3pn + qna∗+QnS (a∗,0)
(
1− e−(3pn+qna∗+QnS(a∗,0))u
)
, (A203)
and
S (n3(u), a) =
εpn
3pn + qna∗+QnS (a∗,0)
(
1− e−(3pn+qna∗+QnS(a∗,0))u
)
. (A204)
Thus, keeping terms linear in ε, we get
lim
a→a∗
X (a,0) =
[
(ρ− 1) 3pn + qna
∗+QnS (a∗,0)
β
− ρ
(
2 +
qna
∗
pn
)]
ε
β+ 3pn + qna∗+QnS (a∗,0)
≥ 0
if and only if β <
pn(qna
∗+QnS(a∗,0)+3pn)
qna∗+2pn and ρ ≥ 11− β(2pn+qna∗)
pn(3pn+qna∗+QnS(a∗,0))
. Further, in the case of
t1→+∞, the first-order condition for the adoption time of the second incumbent is
∂Π̂2
∂t2
= ρ
∂Πo (t1, t2)
∂t2
−
+∞∫
0
e−βu (pn +QnS (n3(u),0))
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×
(
n3(u) +S (a
∗,0) +S (n3(u), a
∗)
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (a∗,0)
))
du
≤
+∞∫
0
e−βudu (pn +QnS (n3(u),0))
×
(
ρ (n3(u)−S (n3(u),0))−n3(u)−S (a∗,0)−S (n3(u), a∗)
(
2 +
Qn
pn
S (a∗,0)
))
≤ 0,
for ρ≤ 1.
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Appendix B: Estimates of FX Trading Volumes and Their Sources
Below we report the data and its sources for the FX example we used to estimate the diffusion
parameters.
In particular, Table B1 shows the estimates for the average daily trading volumes for the “new
entrant”, Currenex, while Tables B2 and B3 show these for the Atriax (“major” incumbent) and
the FXAll (“minor” incumbent).
Date Average Daily Trading Volume, $bn Source
Oct. 2000 0.5 Reuters News, 07/13/2001
Jul. 2001 1.0 Reuters News, 07/13/2001
Jul. 2002 1.5 Reuters News, 07/15/2002
Apr. 2003 3.5 Reuters News, 04/14/2003
Feb. 2004 4.5 Dow Jones International News, 02/20/2004
Mar. 2005 5.0 Reuters News, 03/02/2005
Feb. 2007 40.0 Dow Jones Capital Markets, 02/26/2007
Nov. 2010 250.0 Global Finance, 01/01/2011
Table B1 The average daily trading volumes for the Currenex: estimates and their sources.
Date Average Daily Trading Volume, $ bn Source
Oct. 2001 0.22 Financial News, 10/29/2001
Apr. 2002 0.4* American Banker, 04/26/2002
Table B2 The average daily trading volumes for the Atriax: estimates and their sources. *The estimate for
Apr. 2002 was obtained by averaging the lower estimate (0.3bn) and the upper estimate (0.5bn)
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Date Average Daily Trading Volume, $ bn Source
Aug. 2001 0.2 Reuters News, 03/15/2002
Apr. 2002 1.5 Reuters News, 05/04/2002
Jan. 2003 4 Reuters News, 04/14/2003
Apr. 2003 7.5 Reuters News, 04/14/2003
Jul. 2003 10.6 Reuters News, 07/09/2003
Nov. 2003 13.0 Financial Times, 12/03/2003
Mar. 2004 18.0 Financial Times, 04/14/2004
Oct. 2004 25.0 Financial Times, 10/28/2004
Dec. 2004 30.0 Reuters News, 01/10/2005
Mar. 2005 35.0 Reuters News, 03/14/2005
Oct. 2005 43.0 Reuters News, 10/10/2005
May. 2006 54.0 Reuters News, 05/05/2006
Nov. 2006 64.0 Reuters News, 11/06/2006
Oct. 2007 90.0 Reuters News, 10/04/2007
Mar. 2010 100.0 Dow Jones, 03/26/2010
Nov. 2010 125.0 Global Finance, 01/01/2011
Table B3 The average daily trading volumes for the FXAll: estimates and their sources.
